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The Army's Ethical Dilemma . . . see page 44

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CONTENTS

PAGE 2 GATHERING STORM IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN
by Lieutenant Colonel David J. André, US Army

15 THE DOCTRINE-WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT SYNERGY
by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew E. Andrews, US Army

24 LOW-ALTITUDE MASS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
by Major Lawrence B. Wilkerson, US Army

33 UNDERSTANDING MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING

44 THE ARMY'S ETHICAL DILEMMA
by Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Malcolm J. Brummitt, US Army

48 A LOOK AT THE BRITISH REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
by Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. B. Watson, British Army

60 PREPARING FOR THE BREAKOUT
by Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Kent, US Army

74 REVIEWS *the best from other journals*

78 NEWS

86 LETTERS

89 BOOKS *contemporary reading for the professional*

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This article looks at US relations in the Eastern Caribbean. The author reviews past events in that area as well as the present climate, and speculates about what the future may bring to these neighbors.

Gathering Storm in the Eastern Caribbean

Lieutenant Colonel David J. André, US Army

AMONG those tropical land and seascapes to which harried minds occasionally are wont to retreat from the stresses of workaday reality, the Caribbean region (Figure 1), in particular the islands of the Eastern Caribbean in the West Indies (Figure 2), represents to many the ultimate escape.

Given both a physical and cultural setting that only a Somerset Maugham could have adequately captured in prose, it is easy to disregard almost completely the geopolitical context within which these islands exist. Nonetheless, it is a context that, particularly in light of recent events, has been taking on added significance within the hemisphere and even throughout the rest of the world.

The dynamics of change have been at work irrepressibly throughout the region for centuries. Of late, however, the pace has been quickening, and dramatic new patterns are becoming discernible. Storm clouds, long visible on the distant horizon to those who took the time to scan and reflect on the view, are beginning to approach, gather and thicken. They are like a threatening thunderhead over what, for many just to the north in the United States, including not a few policymakers, have long been just so many islands in the sun.

Aside from the much-publicized events surrounding the 1959 rise to power of

Fidel Castro in Cuba, and the concomitant "camel's nose under the tent" interjection of a Soviet presence into the region, the United States has traditionally regarded the Caribbean Basin as its own backyard. Over the past two centuries, the Monroe Doctrine, big stick diplomacy, the Good Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress have succeeded each other mainly as political bromides rather than substantive policies. As a few observers in the United States and many in Latin America have repeatedly noted, from the beginning of the founding of the republic the United States took for granted that Latin America, the Caribbean in particular, was part of its sphere of influence.[1]

The latter-day rapid deterioration of the regional political situation prompted a review of our Caribbean policy by the Carter administration. Analysts, some of whom have long warned of such developments, have had the unpleasant task of performing a hasty post-mortem on our past policy. This was as a result of the seeming demise of what Abraham F. Lowenthal once called the "hegemonic presumption" upon which the United States traditionally based its policies toward the region.[2]

Evidence suggesting that US-Caribbean relations are undergoing change as never before and that the days of unchallenged US influence in the area are numbered, if not past, continues to mount. The historic "special relationship" between the United States and its neighbors immediately to the south along the "third border" is coming to an end—in fact if not yet in rhetoric.[3]

Political seismographs have recently recorded a number of unusual tremors in the Eastern Caribbean that extrapolative thinking suggests could be leading to a heretofore only imagined occurrence—direct confrontation within the region between the United States and Cuba, if not the Soviet Union itself. A brief look at a few of the more salient events may help place this observation in some perspective.

During the summer of 1979, the existence of a 2,600-man Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba was announced in Washington. The presence of this unit had reportedly been confirmed by the Central Intelligence Agency on 17 August. Carter administration sources later contended, however, that the brigade had been there since the mid-1970s. The aftermath of these often contradictory revelations left the United States with a new and, for some, disturbing strategic reality. The United States, in the view of the administration, had no choice but to accept a permanent Soviet military presence in the Western Hemisphere.

A conventional ground military force of less than 3,000 troops stationed on an island can hardly be considered a direct military threat to the United States. Nonetheless, there may still be profound significance in this development. To illustrate, some observers have already noted the following:

- A joint Soviet-Cuban strategy of military intervention in trouble spots around the world is reinforced. By underwriting the security of Castro's Cuba, the Soviets receive Cuban troops for use as Soviet proxies in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere in Latin America.
- Cuba is being developed by Moscow into one of the dominant military powers in Latin America. Cuba now spends more than twice as much on its armed forces per capita as any of the other Latin-American republics. According to The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Brazil is the only

Latin-American country that has more of its citizens bearing arms than Cuba.[4]

- The Soviets are demonstrating that they can use military power with relative impunity in dealing with local situations around the world, even in an area long regarded as off-limits to foreign military powers, especially to those from outside the Western Hemisphere.
- Considering other Soviet involvement in the southern Kurile Islands close to Japan, in Ethiopia and in Afghanistan, it demonstrates increasing boldness among Soviet leaders in the use of military power.[5]

During the time of the Soviet combat brigade issue, President Carter promised Caribbean Basin nations that "the United States will act in response for assistance in meeting any threats from Soviet and Cuban forces." He added that economic assistance would be forthcoming "to insure the ability of troubled peoples to resist social turmoil and possible communist domination."[6] At the same time, the president directed that certain measures be taken to counter the threat to peace. These measures included intensified surveillance of Cuba, establishment of a joint task force headquarters at Key West and increased US military maneuvers in the area.

As reflected in the actions taken, the strategy adopted by the Carter administration deliberately avoided provocative moves toward the Soviets. There were those who felt that the US approach missed the whole point of the threat posed by the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. The threat went considerably beyond the well-publicized brigade, to include delivery to the Cubans of *MIG23* aircraft, diesel-powered attack submarines, several coastal missile-firing boats and surface-to-surface missiles, and even the possibility of the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba. This seemed to be the view of Henry A. Kissinger who was reported to have said, "There is no solution short of a stronger confrontation with the Soviets."[7]

For two decades, Cuba has been regarded by many as a cancer imbedded in the body politic of the hemispheric community of nations, a disease capable of spreading, particularly to the weaker states. In the 1960s, Castro converted Cuba into a revolutionary center for training, organizing and arming leftist guerrilla movements throughout Latin America. This policy fell on hard times following the destruction of Cuban-led guerrilla organizations in Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and Colombia and the death of Ernesto "Che"Guevara, Castro's closest confidant.

It may have been these failures that led Castro to shift his revolutionary drive to Africa. But Castro apparently now sees new opportunities in Latin America. The agony of several Central American states on the western side of the Caribbean Basin has been on the front pages of US newspapers for months. Cuban involvement on the side of instability and violence has been demonstrated beyond refutation.

As a result of the relatively greater attention given these important developments, events of mounting consequence in the Eastern Caribbean have gone virtually unnoticed by the American public. There is growing concern that the turmoil rampant in the archipelago might create yet another locus of competition and friction between the United States and Cuba that could, in turn, lead to confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The islands of the Eastern Caribbean are at a critical crossroads in their long and turbulent histories. As is commonly the case in developing areas, many were

The Caribbean Area

Figure 1

once colonies of various European countries, mainly Spain, Great Britian, France and the Netherlands. During the stormy era from the 16th to 18th centuries, these powers vied with each other for regional hegemony. The contemporary cultural landscape clearly reflects the cross-cultural interactions that occurred during that period. The island of St. Lucia, for example, changed hands 14 different times within a span of but a few generations.

In more recent years, the move toward independence has been gaining momentum. As contrasted with the violent liberation of many African states, however, the transition has been a relatively deliberate and peaceful one. In the case of the British-related islands, they have gradually evolved from colonies, to associated states, to complete independence. For many years, most of the islands in the region and all of the British possessions except for Montserrat have had complete autonomy with respect to their internal affairs.

The islands of the West Indies, in particular the Lesser Antilles of the Eastern Caribbean, exhibit conditions characteristic of chronic underdevelopment. Allowing for some intraregional variation in the indicators, these conditions include a rapid rate of population growth, widespread grinding poverty exacerbated by

high levels of unemployment and underemployment, poor standards of health and education, and an overall low standard of living.

The raw material base is limited, and transport systems, communications and public utilities are inadequately developed in relation to local needs. There is little manufacturing; the regional economy is strongly dependent on the agricultural and tourism sectors. Local and foreign investment capital is in short supply, and the overall trade balance perennially runs a serious deficit.

Further complicating this already distressing picture are special problems created by economic, political and geographic fragmentation. With a few notable exceptions, the islands are small physical entities separated by rough seas. Thus, they are unable to achieve economies of scale in the domestic production of many basic goods and services. These societies also feel the consequences of inflation, high energy prices and economic slowdown across the world. Such pressures are no doubt reflected in the fact that the islands collectively rank only be-

The Eastern Caribbean

Figure 2

hind Mexico as a source of illegal aliens in the United States.[8]

During the past decade or so, at least some progress has been demonstrated in all of these critical sectors of development. It may also be true, however, that "there is no amelioration for the smallness of an island community."[9]

One of the most troubling recent political developments in the Eastern Caribbean took place in early 1979 on the island of Grenada, home to 110,000 people just off the coast of Venezuela about 100 miles north of Trinidad. On 13 March, the parliamentary government of Sir Eric M. Gairy was unexpectedly toppled forcibly after 12 years in power by supporters of the New Jewel Movement led by Maurice Bishop, a well-known leftist.

Gairy was in the United States attending a meeting of the United Nations. His pleas to the United States and Britain to intervene on his behalf appeared to fall on deaf ears. His past human rights record and recent military alliance with Chile no doubt contributed both to his fall and to the conspicuous lack of response to his plight exhibited in Washington and London.

In the aftermath of the shakeup, it became clear that one of the main factors in the success of the overthrow of the Gairy government was the support given Bishop by Fidel Castro in the form of armed Cubans and a gunboat. Since the coup, Bishop has reportedly jailed scores of opponents; has set up his own special police force with the assistance of the Cuban *Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI)*, allegedly linked to the *KGB* (Committee of State Security); and, with the help of Cuban military technicians, has begun putting together a military force, greatly exceeding local needs, estimated at 1,500.[10] He has also taken a vitriolic anti-US stance, proclaiming on one occasion that "the US military presence and activities in the Caribbean pose a threat to the peace and security of the region."[11]

Other sources play down Bishop's posturing, instead referring to his politics as "social democratic and nationalistic" and noting that the New Jewel Movement is "a profoundly Caribbean movement" and "the pawn of no foreign power."[12] Nonetheless, it is less than comforting to note that Grenada was the first country after Panama to recognize the *Sandinistas* in Nicaragua, even before their victory. Diplomatic ties have also been made with East Germany and Moscow.

The islands of Dominica and St. Lucia soon gave signs of feeling the impact of the radicalization process under way in Grenada. In Dominica, an island state of 80,000 inhabitants 250 miles north of Grenada, the conservative government of Patrick R. John, forced out by social unrest, was replaced by a new left-leaning prime minister, James Oliver Seraphine, in a palace coup.

In St. Lucia, located midway between Dominica and Grenada, leftists scored a sweeping victory in July 1979 in what was that state's first general election as an independent nation. In a campaign punctuated by violence, half of the island's 12,000 inhabitants voted to give Allan Louisy, Labor Party leader, 12 seats in the 17-seat House of Assembly. The outgoing leader, John G. M. Compton, warned that the election of the leftists would throw St. Lucia into a "dark abyss of confusion, coups, and strife."[13]

St. Vincent, 75 miles north of Grenada, has also been the scene of recent disturbing events. The island state gained its independence from Great Britian in October 1979. Six weeks later, in early December, conservative Prime Minister R. Milton Cato was re-elected for another five-year term. His victory was tainted,

however, in that his neocolonial St. Vincent Labor Party gained only 53.5 percent of the vote, a loss of 16 percent from the previous election. Of even greater significance, 14.4 percent went to a three-party "new-left" coalition, the United People's Movement led by Ralph Gonslaves, an acknowledged Marxist. In 1974, the left was able to garner only .8 percent of the vote.[14]

The day following Cato's victory, a group, reported to be of the Rastafarian sect, seized control of Union Island, 16 miles to the south, one of the Grenadines administered by St. Vincent. The revolt was quickly put down, but the very fact of its occurrence in the context of the changing political scene in St. Vincent and the leftist coup in Grenada gave moment for pause.

Within the West Indies, the Soviets already have a lodgment in Cuba. The Cubans, in turn, have gained influence in Jamaica, Grenada and elsewhere in the area as well. All of this says nothing about the socialist experiment in Guyana and the steadily worsening situation in Central America, including Costa Rica, heretofore regarded as one of the most stable democracies in all of Latin America.

In the Eastern Caribbean, questions are currently being asked about the future security of Antigua, St. Vincent, Barbados, and even Trinidad and Tobago. Since the Grenada coup, Eric E. Williams, Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, has responded to US urging and begun spreading some of his state's oil wealth in the form of economic agreements with the three mentioned conservative parties in the hope of forestalling any new destabilizing events. However, Grenada and St. Lucia, the latter of which is partaking of some of the Cuban largess extended to Grenada, have managed to untrack the prospect of a regional security force for use in countering revolution, an idea promoted by the United States and Britain.[15]

The United States cannot afford to allow the Eastern Caribbean to become a haven to those forces whose cause may be inimical to regional, hemispheric and even global stability. Both in geologic and geopolitical terms, these islands form the eastern rim and thus the entrance to the Caribbean Basin, a larger region of profound strategic significance to the United States. To illustrate:

- More than 50 percent of all US oil imports transit the Caribbean, with much of the oil being transferred from supertankers to smaller vessels at deep-water harbors in the Virgin Islands, Trinidad or Curaçao for subsequent delivery to US ports.
- Mexico has growing internal difficulties. It is also becoming an increasingly important oil-producing state. Thus, it is at once more attractive and more vulnerable than ever.
- In 1979, nearly 9 million tons of bauxite used in the production of aluminum was imported from the Caribbean area, principally Jamaica. This figure represents almost 65 percent of all bauxite imported by the United States during that period.
- The Caribbean controls access to the Panama Canal.
- The region is also the strategic link between the North and South Atlantic for navies operating in the two oceans.[16]

Focusing on Grenada alone, its geographic location with respect to nearby places is of particular relevance. Grenada is, for example, on the sea routes of big tankers that bring oil across the Atlantic for refining at Trinidad and Aruba. In this position, Grenada could control the maritime and air traffic along the coast of

Venezuela and westward toward the Panama Canal. Much of the oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa, not to mention that from Venezuela, moves to Trinidad and Tobago and to Aruba for refining before being shipped to the United States as usable distillate fuel.

It is in this context, then, to cite but one example, that informed observers have shown concern regarding the delivery of heavy construction materials to Grenada by a Cuban freighter and the arrival there of several hundred Cuban building specialists and workers to assist in building a large, new airport. Similarly, there is the danger posed by Soviet submarines and bomber aircraft at Cienfuegos, Cuba.[17] Global US military strategy is dependent on the use of the Panama Canal and gulf coast ports for the movement of Pacific and Continental United States-based forces into the Atlantic in the event of crisis in Europe and elsewhere. That strategy may be in danger of being undermined by the growing presence of actual and potentially hostile elements in the Eastern Caribbean.

The outlook for the Eastern Caribbean is far from sanguine, yet it would be decidedly premature to lapse into a state of pessimism over the situation as it has evolved in recent months. The reason is simply that trends in the region are neither uniform nor immutable. Crosscurrents, if often difficult to detect, are, nonetheless, present. One fundamental reality must be borne in mind by onlookers in the United States—who often take such matters for granted. It is that many of these tiny island states are only now beginning the difficult task of translating the recently achieved goal of independence into measurable progress, however slight. The obstacles are many and difficult to overcome, given the meager endowment of available resources of any kind.

On a more positive note, it should be remembered that nowhere in all of Latin America have the Communists gained power by polling a simple majority of the popular vote in free national elections.[18] Hence, they resort to political violence and illegal overthrow of established governments.

If nothing else, the Cuban Communist experiment shows that not even massive economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union is sufficient to solve deep-rooted problems, some of which are created or exacerbated through adoption of the system of government of the state that now finds it necessary to provide this assistance. After all, when Castro took control more than two decades ago, Cuba, if falling considerably short in the area of human rights, enjoyed one of the highest living standards in all Latin America. Today, even sugar, which traditionally has been Cuba's principal product, is rationed to the Cuban people.[19]

The April 1980 spectacle of 10,000 Cubans frantically jamming themselves into the restricted confines of the Peruvian Embassy chancery grounds in Havana in quest of passage out of the country, followed in May by the massive and chaotic seaborne exodus of more than 100,000 Cubans in almost 2,000 boats across the Florida Strait to Key West, are but two vivid reminders that all is far from well in the world of Cuban-style Marxist socialism as administered by Castro.

All of this, of course, does not mean that the United States should be content to sit idly by, complacent in the knowledge that any Communist successes in the Caribbean will, as if mandated by some historical imperative, eventually go the way of the Roman Empire. During

World War II, with the threat of enemy submarines in the Caribbean Sea, US strategists referred to the West Indies as "the bulwarks that we watch." The islands of the Eastern Caribbean constituted the forward edge of this defense.

It would appear that, if indeed the bulwarks have yet to be breached in the contemporary period, there is at least cause for genuine concern at the sight of the rising "red tide." But concern alone is inadequate to the current threat. The United States must act quickly to right a balance knocked askew as much by its own past indifference, inattention and lack of imagination as by more recent Communist initiatives.

In working toward a return of the area to at least a modicum of stability, several realities must be faced. First, there will be no quick fixes and no across-the-board prescriptions for application like a large all-encompassing poultice. The patient is not only ill, but also is afflicted by more than one malady. It is also the case that there is more than one victim of illness. In spite of their smallness, similar histories and relative geographic proximity, the islands today differ greatly among themselves in large part because of deep-rooted animosities and cultural dissimilarities.

What this means in practical terms is that, whereas the United States might appropriately adopt a uniform policy with respect to the region as a whole, we must not expect to be able to apply this policy equally to all the local states in terms of specific programs and commitments. We should avoid seeking out standard solutions. In the context of the historical cultural heritage and contemporary societal dynamics peculiar to each island, there can be none.

By analogy, cameras with built-in light meters are the ultimate in photographic convenience. The meter quickly and easily provides an average reading of local lighting conditions. But this procedure can result in part—maybe even an essential part—of the subject being overexposed or underexposed in the final picture. The discriminating photographer would not think of relying on a single average light setting in his effort at capturing the essence of his subject. Can the policymaker afford to be any the less judicious in his far more important and transcending endeavors with respect to US foreign relations?

Second, we in the United States must recognize that our relations with the various states in the region are not of equal importance. This means we should analyze how the interests and aspirations of the different islands relate to our own and then chart our course with respect to some sense of priorities.

Third, in all our dealings with these island states, we must be convincing. Moreover, we must be perceived as being sincere. This largely comes from dealing on a substantive level that recognizes their recent political coming-of-age. The days are past when empty nostrums, however otherwise pleasing to the ear, might, during periods of stress, buy us enough time to get back to the issues of greater East-West relations. It is a sign of the changing times that the problems the United States will face in the area in the coming decade are not just regional but global problems within which related regional issues must be rationalized and managed accordingly.[20]

By acknowledging and then acting in ways that make clear that the United States views the Eastern Caribbean as part of its larger menu of concerns, and not as some "special case," its relations with the region should assume renewed importance. Having thus perceived that they occupy a meaningful, if not always prominent, place in the greater scheme of things, these states may then begin responding through actions in keeping with their enhanced roles.

Fourth, we should also, to the maximum extent possible given our democratic system of government, be consistent in our relations with the peoples in the region. As even cursory attention to daily news reports makes clear, at any given moment US foreign policy is often being made, articulated and executed by the State Department, the National Security Council and the Congress, to name but three key bodies. The fact that a number of different agencies are involved in foreign affairs is of less consequence than the troubling reality that they all too frequently promote competing or even conflicting views. This serves only to confuse those who may not understand the subtleties of our political system.

This "Tower of Babel" syndrome no doubt reflects a decided lack of concensus among the people of the United States with respect to national security issues in general, a not uncommon circumstance almost throughout the two-century history of the republic. The prevailing characteristics and unique demands of our system of government acknowledged, there is still much to be said for the notion that foreign policy should be more akin to climate than to weather in terms of its relative stability and predictability both in time and in geographic space.

Finally, we should understand that Cold War rhetoric is likely to fall on deaf ears. In these increasingly sophisticated times of rapid mass communications, rising expectations and growing confidence among even the smallest of states, empty

slogans of a bygone era will lead only to skepticism. And this applies not only in the Eastern Caribbean, but also in other key states in the greater Caribbean region.

The world has changed dramatically in the post-World War II period, especially in these once-colonial areas. Our perceptions, both of our interests and security needs, must keep pace accordingly. We should not allow outmoded conceptual frameworks to confine our thinking. By way of illustration, although these small islands have rarely been of great consequence politically in years past, they are now achieving independence at a rapid rate. They, therefore, represent a sizable and growing bloc of votes in the United Nations and in regional bodies like the Organization of American States. Moreover, some now command growing influence in Third World and nonaligned circles. In short, we must accept the world as we find it and respond accordingly.

Change is coming to the region irrespective of any US desires to maintain the status quo, much less return to the halcyon days of US regional hegemony. It remains to be seen whether the United States will be able to live with this inexorable change and guide it along moderate democratic paths. Several islands in the region have already received independence, and more are expected to follow in the near future. With British influence declining, a power vacuum is developing.

Historically, beginning in the early 16th century, the influence of various powers has waxed and then waned as one has replaced another. So it is with US influence. The United States has seemingly been pre-empted in Grenada and elsewhere by the Cubans. And it must be realized that there is not one island in the region that could not go the way of Grenada in the coming decade.

If we are to resurrect even a semblance of the influence we once enjoyed in the Eastern Caribbean, we must proceed deliberately by developing pragmatic policies anchored in some concept of long-term goals and interests. This would appear to be a minimum essential precondition to creating a structure of stability within which the states of the region can pursue their individual destinies in ways constructive to promoting their own interests and the greater cause of mutual US-Eastern Caribbean relations. Erratic, here-today-but-gone-tomorrow US policies based upon short-term swings of emotionalism must be scrupulously avoided.

It must be understood that the goals and aspirations of the states in the region and the strategies adopted in pursuing them may differ considerably from the course we might chart in similar circumstances. This will probably be less attributable to Cuban and other external influences than to the fact that the people there are culturally different from us. The key point is this: As they strive to realize their goals, we cannot expect to achieve all of ours—that is, unless we define our own more rationally, comprehensively, and imaginatively and take into account the essential differences between the states within the region.

Abstract pontificating aside, there is much we can do of a practical, substantive nature in contributing to a regional structure of stability and good will within which even the most disparate goals of well-meaning states can be accommodated. First, we should promote greater involvement in the world order. For example, in economic relations, we should seek to increase both the level of participation and the responsibilities of these small states in the international system.

Second, with respect to development, we should give closer attention and channel our resources to the most fundamental and pressing (if not always the most glamorous) needs.

Related to these first two proposals is the prudence of the US in participating more actively in the newly emerging Caribbean economic structure. This applies to bodies such as the Caribbean Common Market, the Caribbean Development Bank, the World Bank-Caribbean Group and two new organizations—the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development and the Caribbean Central American Action.

These kinds of enterprises should be, to the maximum possible extent, participatory or cooperative programs rather than US creations. At the same time, unilateral direct-aid projects, carefully selected, can be useful as well. They have the added advantage of focusing resources faster, thereby creating a more immediate impact on problems at the local level.

Finally, and without attempting either to magnify or diminish Castro's role in fomenting unrest in the region, it should be recognized that internal strife does not necessarily mean that outsiders are implicated. The fact is that internal tensions often present opportunities for outside interference. As one experienced US diplomat once remarked on the situation in El Salvador, "My opinion is that if Cuba didn't exist it wouldn't make (much) difference."[21]

This is not to say that Castro did not have a hand in creating the current crisis in that country, only that local conditions were such that this ongoing strife cannot be considered a mere happenstance. The same is true of any number of other states throughout the region, the islands of the Eastern Caribbean in particular.

For US intentions and actions to have any real meaning and influence, however, we must have a range of credible military options. This requires maintaining forces adequate to meeting threats to peace, especially those emanating from sources outside the region. It also means possessing the will to employ these forces in the national interest should the need arise. However, except for meeting a clearly defined extrahemispheric threat, overt military intervention should rarely be undertaken unilaterally.

A return to the traditional, unsolicited, unilateral, occupation approach to US military intervention in local affairs, as was practiced in the 19th and early to mid-20th centuries, is clearly unacceptable to most states of the region in the modern period. Short of that, however, there remains ample flexibility in the use or threatened use of military power for assisting in maintaining peace and stability in the region.

The chief threat to the United States in the Eastern Caribbean is not military, however. It is economic and social deprivation leading to the creation of political instability that, in turn, provides conditions conducive to Cuban and Soviet influence. Military aid and protection alone cannot provide the necessary resistance to these inroads although security is required to give stability a chance to root. Under a US-sponsored security umbrella, the United States itself can make better use of economic and political cooperation in an effort to overcome longstanding local development problems.

If the Caribbean area generally, and the Eastern Caribbean region in particular, is to avoid becoming America's Balkans, the United States must move purposefully, resolutely and with imagination in the days ahead. It is already the eleventh hour. We are late. One hopes not too late.

NOTES

1 See, for example, Eduardo Frei Montalva, "The Second Latin American Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1971, pp 83-96, especially Part VII. The author was president of Chile from 1964 to 1970.

2 Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, p 199. At the time of his writing, Lowenthal was director of studies for the Council on Foreign Relations.

3 *Ibid.*

4 "Second Only to Brazil: Cuba Bolsters Its Military Strength," *The Times of the Americas*, 27 February 1980, p 4.

5 "Russians in Our Own Back Yard to Stay?," *US News & World Report*, 15 October 1979, pp 23-24.

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16 The popular print media is increasingly reporting both on the theoretical and practical aspects of the changing geopolitical scene in the Caribbean. See, for example, "US Ready to Show Soviets, Cuba Its Might in Caribbean," *The Baltimore Sun*, 30 March 1980, p 1.

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18 "Subversion Hard to Grasp for Some," *The Times of the Americas*, 7 November 1979, p 2.

19 *Ibid.*

20 For an expanded treatment of this notion, see Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p 210.

21 "New Diplomacy Tested by US in El Salvador," *The Washington Post*, 17 April 1980, p A29.

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

The Doctrine–Weapons Development Synergy

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew E. Andrews, US Army

In this article, the author contends that, too frequently, the military is guilty of procuring a piece of hardware and then attempting to develop an appropriate doctrine for its use. He proposes a new approach aimed at bringing the doctrine and weapons development processes closer together.

RECENTLY, more articles dealing with nuclear weapons have appeared in military journals. Many of these articles advocate a new weapon or prophesy new developments that will make these weapons more useful. For example, see Major Van B. Cunningham's proposal of a nuclear tank round in the July-August 1980 *Armor*[1] or Major John P. Rose's article in the November-December 1979 *Field Artillery Journal.*[2]

In the case of Major Cunningham, he proposes in detail a new weapon and then suggests the caveats that must be considered. In contrast, Major Rose addresses the caveats while treating very lightly the technical and tactical considerations. While both of these authors should be praised for speaking out, they and others now should be encouraged to delve into that region of middle earth where the political, technical and military meet head to head. This article will be a loosely guided tour of this never-never land.

Specifically, to be considered in this article are a theoretical model for identifying weapon requirements, the relationship between doctrine and requirements, and the importance of the time parameter. Then, an abbreviated development of a requirement for a new precision guided munition (PGM) will be presented from which some important lessons can be drawn. In essence, this article is an extension and application of the article "Toward a Tactical Nuclear Doctrine" which appeared in the October 1980 issue of the *Military Review.*[3] The approaches and techniques, however, can be applied to a broader spectrum of military issues.

The Theoretical

In order to describe a theoretical system for force and weapons determination, a few terms need to be defined. Shown in the table is an array of terminology that is neither precise nor necessarily accurate. It does, however, reflect current usage. Another lexicon might use the terms conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic. The important point is to note the singling out of weapons and forces greater than the general war-fighting capability but less than strategic. Using this terminology, one can then establish a theoretical force planning model.

In the determination of a strategic or theater nuclear force and subsets thereof (for example, tactical doctrine, logistical structure, and so forth), it seems reasonable that one would start with the national strategy and/or national purpose, identify limitations and constraints, and then follow a decision tree that accounts for all applicable parameters. As an example in the ideal, once a theater force is determined, its form and structure could cause a change in the national strategy. In turn, an iterative loop is created that leads to a pragmatically ideal force.

Within this context, decision trees can be logically developed for small-unit structure, suitable weapon systems, transition plans, and so forth. These con-

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Current Jargon for the Weapons Array

		Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF)			
Warsaw Pact	Tactical	Operational Tactical		Operational Strategic	Strategic
NATO	General Purpose	Battle-field TNF	Mid-Range TNF	Long-Range TNF	Strategic

clusions form further iterative loops that may cause iteration to the top of the decision tree. Unfortunately, the world is neither static nor predictable, and quantification (and probably qualification) of this approach is impossible.

The above approach being impossible, it appears that decisions in these areas are most frequently made by comparison of advocacy positions and arguments. This, in turn, can lead to inconsistency between separate decisions and suboptimization. Some middle ground should exist.

As a minimum, the parameters of the decision tree from national strategy to the lowest significant decision should be identified. The lowest significant decision is defined as one which *could* cause iteration, however small, with the national strategy. Some factors might include technology; military doctrine and tactics; politics (national and international); command, control and communications; enemy capabilities; geography; time; resources; economics; current posture; and so forth. With such a parametric definition, the probability that cogent issues are addressed in the decision process increases.

In brief, what you want to do should drive the decision of what you have to do. Too frequently, the military is guilty of asking for or buying a piece of hardware or a force structure and then attempting to develop doctrine for its use. Sometimes this approach is successful—sometimes not. The nuclear weapon is a classic example. Thirty-five years after its first use, I believe we do not have a doctrine for its employment.

The Practical

Allowing that doctrine and objectives should lead to requirements, a few practicalities also must be recognized. Most frequently, requirements, especially those suggested by the military at large, are directed toward solving an immediate problem in the context of today's doctrine and environment. Yet the proposed solution will not be available for many years, at which time the environment, and hence the problem, will be different.

For example, in Major Cunningham's tank article, he suggests milling the 155mm nuclear round to fit the *M60A2*. In making this suggestion, does he mean the *W48* round which was first assigned

to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in 1957 or the *W82*?[4] In the former case, the *W48* may not produce the desired results while, in the latter case, the *M60A2* may not be around when the round is available in sufficient numbers.

There are two important lessons in this example. First, ideas or concepts must be evaluated in the context of when they will be possible. Second, while born of specific current requirements and probably first conceived in the details of present equipment, ideas have their greatest value in terms of generic concepts. In the case of Major Cunningham's tank, his idea joins the set of generic concepts concerning putting nuclear firepower forward and decentralizing its employment.

The Example

The nuclear tank is said to *join* a generic concept of putting nuclear weapons forward because this idea is not new. For example, the *Davy Crockett* was intended to put nuclear weapons in the hands of the battalion commander. In *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives*, R. G. Shreffler's chapter titled "The New Nuclear Force" suggests and supports a concept of fixed, distributed strongpoints with immediately responsive low-yield nuclear fires.[5] While most military personnel will have difficulty accepting Shreffler's general concept, the generic idea of distributed employment of low-yield weapons forward is not unique —rather generic.

Constraints

The following list of constraints reflects a combination of interpretation of evidence, professional judgment and cloudy crystal-ball gazing. Anyone may challenge individual parameters as to degree but must accept them as plausible constraints. Dwelling on degree, though, is not very productive because any analysis needs to take place within the context of the credible worst case. In each case, the constraint as stated reflects a worst-case situation. Further, keep in mind that this is an example and is not intended to withstand rigorous examination in detail.

- Theaterwide air superiority may not exist. At best, US forces should expect parity, with superiority achievable temporarily on a local level. The impact is that the US Army quickly will have to learn to fight a three-dimensional war. Cover and concealment will take on added meaning and value when considered with regard to survivability. The enemy will have extreme freedom in using the air space over his forces near the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Air-launched PGMs directed from aerial observation platforms could give the enemy excellent close air support from a sanctuary.
- Electronic warfare will make voice radio communication very difficult. Command and control on a real-time basis over large distances may be almost impossible, and signals emanating from command and control centers probably will identify them as lucrative targets and serve as targeting beacons for missile attack.
- Fighting elements should be self-sufficient for several days at a time. The need to conserve ammunition will conflict with the need to destroy the enemy whenever he presents a suitable target. Preplanned and contingency planned resupply of independent elements will be essential to successful operations.
- Extended operations (several days)

in a chemical-biological environment must be anticipated, with severe implications for fighting ability and morale.

- Every attempt will be made to reduce collateral damage. (This constraint may be unrealistic, but is unavoidable in today's political climate.) Some believe the attempt may result in nuclear sanctuaries for the enemy within friendly territory if the enemy penetrates the forward edge of the battle area and captures a city. If this were true, friendly units might have to fight conventionally in a nuclear environment.
- The scale or depth of battle will grow. Engagements will occur with several kilometers between forces in order to provide sufficient "standoff" distance. Higher terrain will become even more valuable for observation and fields of fire, and key terrain will more frequently gain the attention of target analysts. Aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles may be used extensively to create artificial high ground for observation. Bad weather and poor visibility will be exploited, and the use of smoke will increase.
- Specific battles (size of combatant units unknown) *may* be very short because of the magnitude of weapon effects. No unequivocal evidence exists, however, to indicate that the theaterwide conflict will be short. For example, if lightning war in Europe is quickly blunted, the conflict could continue indefinitely. Being able to provide continuing service support for a long time is thus essential.
- The service support function should be dispersed throughout the theater if it is to survive. Again, real-time command and control will be significantly inhibited by lack of communication.
- The lack of communication will impede troop warning, so nuclear employment may not be well-coordinated. Loss of night vision could be frequent, and dose accumulation from friendly bursts will be very difficult to control. Finally, medical evacuation probably will be slow, perhaps occurring only when a unit (size to be determined) is replaced.

Some of these constraints represent a worst-case, tactical nuclear environment. Hostilities not involving nuclear weapons probably relax the restrictions of a chemical-biological environment, the concern for collateral damage, the scale of the battlefield and the need to disperse for survival. But electronic warfare and the lack of air superiority, coupled with the larger battlefield because of PGMs, probably make the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear less significant at combatant level.

Also, impairment of the command and control function will be similar in either environment because it is primarily a function of the enemy's electronic warfare capability. A major effect in escalating from a nonnuclear to a nuclear environment is in the service support functions. In all instances, however, the need to disperse for survival is the most stringent requirement.

The Force and the Battle

In composing a military force, it is reasonable either to accommodate current doctrine or suggest a way for transition to the proposed doctrine. Also, the proposed force should be attainable with current technology. Otherwise, the impracticality can argue for rejection. This point is consistent with use in a future environment in that it allows for greatly reduced development lead times, thereby making the future environment closer to the present.

As a result of the 1973 October Middle East War, US tactical doctrine has changed to embrace the potential of the PGM. On offense, the use of terrain for cover and concealment during movement is emphasized. On defense, the need for movement and surprise while destroying enemy forces is at the heart of the active defense. In both cases, the military aspects of terrain command greater attention.

In theory, the platoon becomes a key element in an integrated system of firepower and mobility. Platoon battle positions are established for engaging the enemy in kill zones. While platoon battle positions fall within company battle positions, the platoon is a good building block because it is the smallest element capable of destroying armor at a distance of 1 kilometer. As such, it is on the threshold of being a lucrative nuclear target. Recall that the platoon has the *Dragon* PGM with a range of 1,000 meters. The *TOW*, with a range of about 3 kilometers, is found at company level. Consider the following proposed force:

- Each platoon consists of three squads mounted in infantry fighting vehicles. Each vehicle has a mounted and a dismounted PGM launcher and a basic load of 10 or more PGMs. Three *Stinger*-type systems are on each vehicle as well. Other conventional armament is available to the squad. A fourth combat vehicle per platoon carries the platoon leader and headquarters personnel.
- The PGMs on each vehicle have the following characteristics:

Signature: None.

Range: 5 to 8 kilometers.

Guidance: Fire and forget.

Warhead: Shaped charge with a 1-kiloton insertable nuclear component capability[6] (fired at a point in space to avoid fallout).

- Insertable nuclear components are maintained in permissive action link protected containers on each vehicle. Release would be on a general basis and would be communicated by means of an electronic box similar to the Interactive Display Terminal developed by Litton Data Systems. This same programmable box forms the key to security and survivability for decentralized execution and tactical communication.[7]
- Cannon artillery is held in reserve for counterattacks and offensive operations. This holding back allows for dispersion and survivability in a nuclear environment and maximization of capabilities through preplanned, larger yield fires. In essence, giving the front-line elements nuclear-tipped PGMs puts artillery in their hands. Of course, in a conventional environment, cannon artillery can function as it currently does.
- Missile artillery (for example, the *Pershing*, *Lance*, Corps Support Missile System) is relegated to targeting second-echelon forces in conjunction with a tactical air-to-surface missile-type system. Through real-time target acquisition, analysis and distribution, both fixed and transient targets can be engaged. The major impediments to successful employment would be a hostile air environment for the acquisition aircraft and concentration of enemy forces in sanctuary areas (cities). In addition, an electronic warfare environment would reduce effectiveness, depending on friendly electronic counter-countermeasure capabilities.
- If the enemy is attacking, it is assumed he has gained local air superiority. His equivalent to a tactical air-to-surface missile target-acquisition aircraft is moving behind the FLOT looking for battle positions. Aerial launch platforms are in position to provide nuclear close air support. Such an environment mandates

Interactive Display Terminal

that air defense equipment with ranges of 30 kilometers or more be moved forward to engage the enemy on his side of the FLOT. In essence, air defense becomes antiaircraft artillery by taking an aggressive role.

- All considerations of the air battle indicate that close air support will not exist during defensive operations. This indication is not unreasonable. Air Force elements will be fighting for air superiority which must be won to assume the offense.
- The defensive battle is fought by platoons and companies. Higher headquarters mainly monitors the war, looking for the decisive moment to commit reserves. The platoons employ shoot-and-scoot tactics with nuclear weapons. Considering engagement areas and the natural dispersion of the combat units, fires are "self-coordinating."

After firing, platoons and companies retreat on covered and concealed routes to new battle positions, reporting progress by using electronic alphanumeric burst transmissions. The battlefield would look like a series of miniature Cannaes.[8] Depleted or destroyed platoons are replaced by fresh units occupying the next battle positions. This arrangement also is the principal means for evacuating wounded personnel and whole units exposed to excessive radiation. Resupply is achieved the same way, with higher headquarters playing a major integrating function to ensure adequate service support.

- The force concept described requires dispersion of support units and decentralized execution. Whereas medical elements can occupy towns and cities, thus receiving sanctuary, other combat service support elements cannot. If concentration of other than medical elements is deemed necessary, a tactical antiballistic missile system becomes a requirement for survival.

The same position holds for Air Force elements. Ideally, flexible aircraft capable of grass-strip operations and having *mobile* ground support equipment will allow for dispersion of Air Force operations. If the less-than-ideal fixed base is necessary, additional tactical antiballistic missile assets will be required.

A nuclear-tipped PGM can provide the flexibility needed for a ground force to shift from conventional to tactical nuclear warfare without a major convul-

sion. It allows one force to meet the spectrum of response requirements in a doctrinally coherent manner. And it allows for an evolutionary change in tactics. But it also requires major changes in concepts. These include:

- Decentralized execution (a frustration to higher headquarters).
- A general release at platoon level (1 kiloton). (Note: Detailed control of higher yields is still possible.)
- Targeting by lieutenants.
- Possible capture of nuclear material by enemy forces.

Conclusions

Each of the conceptual changes listed has implications all the way through the chain of command. The most debated, of course, would be general release and targeting by lieutenants, both of which run counter to the political consensus. Recall that, during the Kennedy administration, the directive creating the permissive action link system was created. Since then, the tight control offered by this system has never been questioned by any US president. Also, indiscriminate use would be objected to by our allies who are very concerned about collateral damage. To summarize, then, nuclear weapons are special weapons!

A weapon or issue does not have to be special, however, to impact throughout the defense establishment and beyond the executive branch of government. There are the obvious items that have treaty implications such as chemical weapons and antiballistic missile systems. But there are also systems whose high dollar values, either individually or collectively, attract congressional interest. In such instances, it is possible for military policy and doctrine to be established through legislation.

Within the Department of the Army today, the approach to doctrine development is short-term while weapons and systems procurement is getting longer. With this view, one can hardly expect doctrine or mission considerations to be the basis of weapons requirements. Yet we do see creative thinkers such as Majors Cunningham and Rose attacking elements of the problem.

Now, a greater effort to think through the problem in generalist fashion is needed. Of course, the technologist might be attacked by the political scientist; or the political scientist might be assailed by the tactician; or whatever combination one wants to imagine. But, more importantly, a synergy might occur that will bring the doctrinal and weapons development processes closer together.

NOTES

1 Major Van B. Cunningham, "Nuclear Rounds for Tanks," *Armor*, July-August 1980, pp 65-66.

2 Major John P. Rose, "Nuclear Weapons: Image versus Reality," *Field Artillery Journal*, November-December 1979, pp 46-50.

3 Lieutenant Colonel Andrew E. Andrews, "Toward a Tactical Nuclear Doctrine," *Military Review*, October 1980, pp 13-19.

4 *Nuclear Weapons Systems*, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory pamphlet, undated.

5 R. G. Shreffler, "The New Nuclear Force," *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Taylor & Francis Ltd., London, Eng., 1978, pp 296-341.

6 An insertable nuclear component capability refers to being able to convert a conventional weapon to a nuclear one by replacing part of the conventional weapon with nuclear components. In this case, a simple field operation is envisioned.

7 The Litton device allows communication via a graphic display whose grid is adjusted to correspond to local maps. Early warning can be provided through symbology. Messages can be encoded and transmitted in very short, burst transmissions, with electronic acknowledgement of receipt.

8 At the Battle of Cannae (216 B.C.), the center of Hannibal's Carthaginian forces withdrew in the face of the Roman army. Hannibal's forces then attacked from the sides of the artificially created salient and destroyed the Roman army.

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Navy to Receive Automated Storage and Retrieval Systems. The Naval Supply Systems Command has awarded a letter contract to Sperry Corporation to develop automated systems for naval supply centers at three locations.

Under the terms of the contract, Sperry will define the requirements of a computer-controlled material handling system; design, procure, install and test the system; produce the necessary controlling software; provide computers and communications equipment necessary to integrate the warehouses at each site; link them with the Navy's inventory control system; and modify current facilities at the warehouses to be compatible with the new system.

The automated systems will replace the manual systems currently in use. The systems are designed to increase productivity by reducing the amount of manual labor and to increase the responsiveness of the supply centers to the US Navy fleet requirements for urgently needed material, especially in crisis situations.

The contractor will develop the Naval Integrated Storage Tracking and Retrieval System (NISTARS) for three supply centers. NISTARS will be able to control automatically virtually all aspects of supply center functions.

As currently planned, parts and material will be held in storage areas as high as 40 feet and will be in bins, racks or pallets, depending on the size of the item. Small parts will be stored in bins which are automatically retrieved as directed by the computer. Rackable items will be stowed and retrieved by personnel who ride the aisles in special cabs equipped with computer terminals and printers. Items on pallets will be stored and retrieved by special handling devices also under the direction of the computer.

The systems are expected to be operational by August 1983.

This article examines the advantages of low-altitude parachute jumps under combat conditions. The author reviews the use of this technique during World War II by US airborne units and proposes further study to explore possible applications in the future.

Low-Altitude Mass Tactical Operations

Major Lawrence B. Wilkerson, US Army

AT A MEETING last year of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Airborne/Airlift Committee (TA/AC), a question arose concerning the feasibility of conducting mass tactical parachute drops at and below an altitude of 500 feet in combat.[1] No answers were proffered at the meeting except that the idea is, in fact, technically feasible. Other questions developed for further study in-

cluded: Is it necessary to conduct drops at extremely low altitudes? Is it practical to conduct low-altitude drops? Is it economically possible to develop such a drop capability?[2]

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate, in brief, that a study effort should, above all, be firmly based on comprehensive historical analysis. The groundwork for such an effort is already laid. Therefore, the fallacy so frequently encountered in the Army's combat development community—that is, "reinventing the wheel"—can and should be avoided.

A wealth of information is readily available to support a comprehensive historical analysis. Such a largesse of data is directly attributable to the fact that, at the close of World War II, the US Army possessed the most formidable—and experienced—airborne force in the world. This vast strike force consisted of a corps headquarters, five airborne divisions, six independent parachute regiments and three separate parachute infantry battalions.[3] Most of the cadre of this awesome force were combat-tested, in both the European and North African theaters and the Pacific theater.

Figures 1 and 2 identify operations in which airborne units proved their mettle. The figures also contain the type data that would, of course, be necessary for the analysis mentioned above. By scanning the second column on each figure (labeled "Jump Altitude"), one can appreciate World War II airborne planners' (and the executors of those plans) understanding of the feasibility of parachute operations at and below 500 feet altitude. In short, these men not only considered the idea highly feasible, they also put it into action in combat as frequently as possible.

Further study of the figures (and the historical data they represent) indicates that relatively few problems resulted from low jump altitudes when considered in light of the circumstances at the time and the advantages to be gained. Frequent injuries were experienced, but there were extraordinarily few deaths. Most injuries resulted from high winds, obstacles and equipment on the drop zones and from failure to locate the correct drop zones—that is, dropping in the wrong place.

This latter problem, essentially one of poor navigation during hours of darkness and periods of limited visibility, far outstripped all others in contributing to decreased unit efficiency and increased injuries. The transport wings of the US Army Air Corps did not enjoy a very good reputation for finding drop zones in the dark or when target areas were cloaked in ground fog and mist. Examination of the situation that existed, however, clears the wings of too much censure:

- There was precious little training time.
- The unglamorous troop carriers had to compete with fighter and bomber wings for pilots.
- There was almost total dependence on dead-reckoning navigation despite *Eureka* radars, pathfinders, pre-positioned ships, and so forth, most of which never worked consistently. But that is another matter altogether and beyond the scope of this article.

It is also obvious that considerations other than avoidance of antiaircraft and antipersonnel fires dictated the use of low jump altitudes:

- The lack of numerous large drop zones (a problem that is far more severe today due to urban sprawl).
- The need to limit dispersion as an aid to rapid assembly of effective combat power.
- The need for pinpoint accuracy.

Mass Parachute Operations—European Theater of Operations/ North African Theater of Operations

Units	Jump Altitude	Action	Remarks
509th Parachute Infantry Battalion	300-500 feet	Tafaraoui Airfield (in support of *Torch*)	Thirty-nine *C47* aircraft and 556 paratroopers flew approximately 1,500 miles; formation was partially dispersed; visibility decreased throughout flight; confused radio frequencies for air-to-ship communications; uncertainty as to friendliness of French reception; no plane made the objective; numerous soldiers injured in drops.
509th Parachute Infantry Battalion	300 feet	Youks Les Bains	Twenty-two *C47* aircraft and 350 paratroopers; fighter escort provided; visibility poor to fair; no enemy on objective; pin-point accurate drop; 20 minutes to assemble; only 15 soldiers injured by rough terrain.
Raiding Party, 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion	300-500 feet	Al-Jem Bridge	Army Air Corps pilots dropped the raiding party *south* of the bridge instead of *north* as planned; therefore, bridge was never destroyed. Navigation at night was the overriding problem. No injuries.
British 1st Air Landing Brigade; US 82d Airborne Division (–)	500-600 feet	Sicily	25 to 35 mile-per-hour winds over drop zones complicated landings; however, of far greater significance was the Air Corps' inability to locate the proper drop zones given the conditions under which they had to operate. The 266 *C47s* carrying the first wave of American paratroopers had to fly a 415-mile circuitous course at 200 feet above a choppy sea at night—while keeping in tight formations! Characteristic of the accuracy of the drops was that, out of 3,045 paratroopers in Colonel Gavin's element, he could only find some 20 men four hours after the drop. The British fared even worse: The 1st Air Landing Brigade lost *90* gliders in the sea with all hands on board. Equally disastrous was the toll of *C47s* shot down by friendly gunners. Despite all of this and more, however, the airborne units accomplished their missions and were later to earn glowing tributes from the German forces against whom they fought in Sicily.
82d Airborne Division*	600 feet	Salerno	Pinpoint accuracy (except for Company B, 1st Battalion, 504th). The jump was directly into the Salerno beachhead using pathfinders and lighted *Ts*. Remarkably, no planes and no paratroopers were lost in the drop.
509th Parachute Infantry Battalion	Indicated altitudes ranged from 4,000 to 6,000 feet	Avellino	Incredible dispersion caused by lack of Air Corps' ability to properly navigate to drop zone and to stay in tight formation resulted in a complete disaster. Contributing to the problems were 4,000-foot (+) mountains surrounding the drop zone. Of some 40 planes carrying the main body, only 10 found the drop zone. The remainder spread out their drops over a 40 to 50-mile area.
—	—	Anzio	No drops conducted.

*504th Parachute Infantry (minus its third battalion); 505th Parachute Infantry.

Units	Jump Altitude	Action	Remarks
British 6th Airborne Division; US 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division	500 feet	Normandy	Some 1,086 transports participated in the early morning drops (beginning at 0021 for the main body). Pathfinders were badly scattered or in close proximity to the enemy and unable to assist most main elements. A few drops were accurate, but many more were not. However, again due to the flexibility and resilience of the paratroopers, most missions were accomplished. The sad aspect of this particular large drop was that so many needless deaths occurred due to the dispersion—many of them in swamps and backwaters. A bright aspect was that these units accomplished their missions with over 60 percent of their supplies, heavy equipment, and so forth destroyed, damaged or unlocatable. This was no mean feat and gave further testimony to the extraordinary ingenuity, initiative and staying power the supposedly "fragile" paratrooper could display when the chips were down.
1st Airborne Task Force**	400-600 feet	*Dragoon* in Southern France	Pathfinders, due to heavy ground fog, missed drop zones by as much as 15 miles. Main body (beginning at approximately 0430), without ground guidance, made an incredibly accurate drop: 80 percent (+) of the troops hit their drop zones.
British 1st Airborne Division; US 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division; Polish 1st Parachute Brigade	400 feet	*Market-Garden* (The Netherlands)	Daylight operations that were extremely accurate for the most part. Sunday, 17 September 1944, saw 1,500 (+) transports and almost 500 gliders in the air simultaneously. Eleven hundred Allied fighters gave escort. Heavy antiaircraft fire (coupled with the daylight conditions) took a considerable toll: D-day alone saw approximately 70 planes lost. But the paratroopers themselves reported it was an incredibly accurate drop.
British 6th Airborne Division; US 17th Airborne Division	400-600 feet	Rhine Crossing	Almost 1,700 transports and 1,300 (+) gliders participated in this crossing. Some 2,100 (+) Allied fighters gave escort. Although only 6 miles of the air delivery routes were over enemy territory, antiaircraft fire was intense (especially since it was around 1000 when the drops commenced). The 513th Parachute Infantry, for example, lost 22 *C46s* over a belt of German antiaircraft weapons. Dispersion was again bad due to ground haze and just plain confusion. However, though often jumping directly atop firing enemy artillery batteries, or into another unit's drop zone, or 2 to 3 miles from their intended drop zone, the paratroopers accomplished their missions.

**British: 2d Independent Parachute Brigade
US: 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion (Reinforced)
517th Parachute Combat Team
550th Glider Infantry Battalion
551st Parachute Infantry Battalion

Figure 1

Mass Parachute Operations—Southwest Pacific Theater of Operations

Units	Jump Altitude	Action	Remarks
503d Parachute Infantry Regiment	400 feet	Nadzab Airfield	Daylight operation: 4.5 minutes for entire regiment to jump; extremely accurate. In a theater whose resources were extremely austere, this operation consisted of 82 *C47s* protected by over 100 fighters, several squadrons of *B25* bombers rigged with machineguns, smoke-laying *A20s* and three *B17* bombers.
503d Parachute Infantry Regiment (–) (1,424 men)	175 feet/ 400 feet	Numfoor Island	Numerous bulldozers, landing crafts, trucks, and so forth were on drop zone which was an extremely hard airstrip made of coral. Jump was begun around 1000; *C47s* flew two abreast; and, of the first 700 or so jumpers, 10 percent were injured on landing. Interestingly, the first two *C47s*, due to barometric altimeter error, dropped below 200 feet. The first of these planes, carrying the regimental commander, Colonel George M. Jones, had 18 jumpers aboard. After parachuting from such a low altitude, nine were critically injured. All told, when the 1,400 (+) men had jumped, the injury rate was about 9 percent; however, the equipment and the rock-hard strip contributed significantly to this high injury rate. Had the altitude been higher, dispersion would have been far worse, and it is questionable whether injuries would have been less (excepting, of course, the first two *C47s*).
511th Parachute Infantry Regiment	400-600 feet	Tagaytay Ridge (Manila Operations)	Daylight drop made in three echelons. The first echelon consisted of 48 *C47s* whose troops dropped on smokepots put out by pathfinders who had infiltrated into the area. Confusion in the following planes of the first echelon, however, caused them to execute short of the drop zone in thick jungle. The second echelon, in 51 *C47s*, came in around noon and, instead of dropping on the smokepots, dropped on the discarded chutes of the paratroopers who had missed the drop zone earlier; therefore, as absurd as it now (and then too) seems, they missed the drop zone also. The third echelon, coming in the next day, jumped perfectly. In all, there were some 50 jump injuries in the entire regiment even though many jumpers landed in thick jungle.
Rock Force*	500 feet	Corregidor	25-mile-per-hour winds and an extremely limited space on "Topside" drop zone restricted transports to delivering only six men per pass. The regimental commander, Colonel Jones, predicted 50 percent casualties on the mission. Pre-jump bombing and strafing left jagged concrete, splintered trees, and so forth to await the paratroopers. But the assault took the Japanese totally by surprise. In the initial echelon (of three planned jump waves), jump in-

*503d Parachute Combat Team (drop element); 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry (ground/amphibious element).

Units	Jump Altitude	Action	Remarks
			juries and enemy action took a toll of almost 25 percent of the force, but the battle belonged to the Americans. As for the second wave of paratroopers, they jumped shortly after noon, and enemy ground fire took some 50 while still in the air. However, Colonel Jones had over 2,000 men on "The Rock" then. Jump injuries in the second wave were high but not nearly as high as Colonel Jones had predicted. The third wave came in via landing craft instead of parachute. Japanese losses were some five times the US losses.
Company A, 1st Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment**	400 feet	Los Baños Prison	One of the most incredibly successful and exceptional operations to occur in World War II. However, it gained little fame as it was overshadowed by such actions as that on Iwo Jima to the northeast. This action outstrips the Son Tay Raid in its daring execution and, of course, its complete success—especially within the context of the times and circumstances. One paratrooper was injured within the jump echelon. Some 3 to 4 minutes after the paratroopers landed, the attack on the prison began. Every guard in the prison was killed, and over 2,000 prisoners were liberated without any of them being injured.

**Also participating, of course, were 1st Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment (minus Company A), and 59 amphibious tractors; 457th Parachute Field Artillery; Division Reconnaissance Platoon—11th Airborne Division; Filipino guerrillas; and 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment—all in ground or ground/amphibious roles.

Figure 2

- The need to limit enemy observation when airborne troops were not jumping "on top of him."[4]

Another area, not depicted in the figures, that clearly demonstrates the attitude of World War II airborne commanders toward low jump altitudes was their training program. Consider, for instance, the case of Lieutenant Colonel Edson Raff's 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion in England in 1942.[5] In preparation for his battalion's participation in Operation *Torch*, Colonel Raff and his men, using the *C47* aircraft of the US 60th Troop Carrier Wing, made jumps "both day and night from low altitudes, usually around 650 feet."[6]

These men not only jumped into combat from low altitudes, they trained that way as well. Equally illuminating was the extraordinarily rigorous physical training program which routinely included five, 10, 15 and 20-mile runs, 25-mile walks in eight hours and 50-mile walks in 24 hours. The major objective of such a strenuous program was development of paratroopers who could think fast and endure physical abuse—both critical demands associated with jumping at low altitudes.

A positive opening parachute was an-

other necessity for low-altitude parachute operations. The World War II airborne trooper possessed just that in the US Army's *T5* parachute. Developed by Irwin Parachute Company, the 28-foot canopy could damage a paratroopers shoulders if he was not careful. However, it was safe and reliable considering the state of the art in the early 1940s and the tactical need to get down low during mass parachute operations.

Conversely, today, the US Army uses the *T10B* and the *MC1-1B* parachutes (the *B* designation indicates an anti-inversion net modification). These are "peacetime" parachutes: they are rugged, extremely safe and reliable, virtually malfunction-proof and have smooth opening characteristics that barely tell a trooper when his canopy has inflated. They are not positive opening parachutes and, therefore, are not suitable for mass parachute operations at 500 feet and lower. They are—compared to the *T5*—a luxury item: safe, secure, reliable and easy on the shoulder blades.[7]

A minimum altitude of 650 feet (including safety buffers) is required to produce these peacetime niceties.[8] Transition to a safer environment is normal, however, when an army undergoes some 35 years of nonuse of airborne troops per se—that is, parachute-delivered into a combat zone on a recurring basis. Peacetime considerations eventually overwhelm the combat requirements. And, too, perhaps conditions have changed. Perhaps there is no longer a need to "get down" in order to achieve success in mass parachute operations.

Hopefully, the answer would be found in a detailed study such as that proposed earlier. Results from the US Air Force Close Look II Study[9] and assessments of the threat made in other contiguous areas tend to prove that conditions have not changed, that, in fact, the need for airborne forces to stay low may now be more pressing than ever.

Even though I have only brushed the tip of the historical iceberg in this article, it should be abundantly clear that a historical analysis is essential to any effort aimed at developing the proper doctrine for parachute-delivered forces and equipment. A wealth of information is readily available from men such as James Gavin, Napier Crookenden, Cornelius Ryan, Gerard Devlin, William Yarborough and many others to support a study effort. Data are available in the Army's historical files as well.

Contained within this wealth of data is a resounding affirmation of the utility of parachute-delivered forces in today's and the foreseeable future's operations. Included also are clear and definite answers to the questions, "Are low-level operations practical?" and "Can the US Army, given constrained resources, develop the capability to perform them?"

The ironic aspect of this historical analysis is that it demonstrates such a capability is directly before us and has always been so since that awesome armada of 1945 was, for the most part, consigned to oblivion.

It has been said that the most sincere form of praise is emulation. I suspect that there is far more than mere emulation in the Soviet approach to the *vozdushno desantnaya operatsiya* (airborne operation), which can only be described vis-à-vis our own approach as massive. There is, as is so often the case with the Soviets, a meticulous analysis of history which determines the direction of their efforts. One need only be familiar with the Soviet airborne force structure as well as the following two definitions to fully appreciate the Soviet outlook toward airborne (to include parachute) operations.

US Air Force

US paratroopers landing in New Guinea during World War II

The first is the Soviet definition of the *vozdushno-desantnaya diviziya* (airborne division):

The basic combined-arms operational-tactical formation of airborne troops. It consists of several regiments, (artillery) battalions . . . subunits of the various Services and special troops. An airborne division is intended to carry out missions in the enemy's deep rear, in coordination with ground troop and missile forces formations, and also with the air force and navy.[10]

The second is their definition of *vozdushnyy desant* (airborne assault):

Troops airlifted to the enemy rear to conduct combat activities there. According to its scale, an airborne assault may be tactical, operational, or strategic. The assault may be effected either by parachute or from landed aircraft, or by a combination of both.[11]

These two definitions bespeak a concept for the use of airborne forces, including parachute-delivered elements, on a massive scale. Further, they reveal not

an inkling of the feeling, which is commonplace among some 20th-century theoreticians, that airborne operations are passé. These definitions do, in fact, conjure up visions much like those that possessed the minds of US airborne commanders before the deactivation of the majority of their forces and the atrophy following that abrupt action. (This concept, to a certain extent, of course, was put into action by US and British forces in Normandy, the Netherlands and Germany.)[12]

In this brief article, I have discussed a particular situation in which the US Army has the potential to defy the too prevalent illogic of man's natural bent toward learning nothing from history. Combat developers within the Army can, in short, analyze the historical data, determine what is necessary and, even in the face of an austere budget, achieve it. Low-altitude mass parachute operations are indeed a thing of the past; but, this author feels, they must be a thing of the future as well.

NOTES

1 The TA/AC is a chartered organization whose mission is: "To function as an institutional group on a continuing basis to coordinate effective interaction and responsiveness among the proponent, tester, developer, and user agencies and to recommend appropriate policies and programs. . . ." The committee is "the focal point within TRADOC for all activities relating to the combat development of airborne/airlift materiel, doctrine, and organization. . . ." The chair of the committee is maintained at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

2 The common position formulated by the TA/AC relative to these questions was: "The operational concept for the combat delivery of individual parachutists and equipment needs to be identified. . . ." and, further: "The minimum altitudes and maximum airspeeds for the air-dropping of personnel and equipment must be defined in the operational concept." Minutes of the TA/AC meeting at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 24 April 1980, p 7.

3 The corps was the XVIIIth; the divisions were the 82d, 101st, 11th, 13th and 17th.

4 Other NATO countries, for instance, list the capability to avoid enemy radar reconnaissance of drop areas as a number one priority in their efforts to develop a low-altitude parachute capability.

5 Gerard M. Devlin, *Paratrooper! The Saga of Parachute and Glider Combat Troops—1914 to 1945*, St. Martin's Press Inc., N.Y., 1979, p 678, Note 2 to Chapter 5. As per Mr. Devlin's explanation in the note, I use the designation "509th" because this is the one with which we are most familiar and, of course, the battalion's ultimate designation. Actually, as of February 1942, the battalion was the 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry. It was not until 1943 that it was redesignated the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion.

6 *Ibid.*, p 142.

7 There has been speculation of late—familiar to all of those associated on a daily basis with the airborne community within the US Army—as to the "safety" of the *MC1-1B* parachute due to a number of fatalities that have occurred since its introduction into mass parachute operations. A close look at the malfunction/injury/death rates, however, shows that since application of the "B" modification (anti-inversion net), both the *T10* and the *MC1-1* are extremely safe parachutes.

8 Since World War II, the lowest approved altitude (though there is no occasion of its actual use on any wholesale basis) for training of US paratroopers that I can find is 750 feet. The approval of this altitude was based on possible barometric altimeter error, mean opening time of the main parachute, mean opening time of the reserve parachute and minimum time necessary to recognize a malfunction and activate the reserve. The reserve parachute has always been a US *must*, so to speak, from the earliest airborne drop on. The British, on the other hand, went through the entire war without using reserve parachutes. It was not until the late 1950s (circa 1959) that they, too, began using reserve parachutes. All World War II US drops were made *with* reserve parachutes.

9 Close Look II Study, Headquarters, Military Airlift Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., February 1980.

10 *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms (A Soviet View)*, Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p 45.

11 *Ibid.*, p 47.

12 These were airborne operations in support of the Normandy invasion, Operation *Market-Garden* and the Rhine crossing, Wesel, Germany, respectively.

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

Understanding Military Contingency Planning

Military contingency planning has often taken place under circumstances of great urgency which hindered understanding of broader national defense planning issues, including political objectives that required military capability and planning. The chief of staff of the Army recently held a contingency planning seminar at the US Army War College. Twenty-one Army general officers met to exercise an improved approach to the current planning process against a specific regional scenario and evaluate the results of their planning using a computer-assisted war game. This article presents features of that seminar, including an improved process for defense planning, fresh thought for regional-unique military contingency planning and the key lessons learned.

A Staff Product of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, and the US Army War College.—Editor.

Military Planning Objectives

THE principal purpose of military planning is to provide for the most effective use of military forces in meeting challenges to our security interests. In so doing, we seek to:

- Supply multiple options for national command authorities (NCAs), with full recognition that military capabilities must be subordinated to the attainment of political objectives.

- Base military planning on the most current and authoritative guidance available, especially regarding assumptions on prehostility actions which US political authorities are prepared to take in responding to threats to our interests.

- Inform civilian authorities of the risks associated with our plans.

- Render judgments regarding the most effective use of additional resources to reduce those risks.

These objectives represent the requirements to which an effective planning system must conform.

Planning Principles

Before describing the planning process, we need to consider what characteristics are important:

- *Early top down guidance:* If anything, experience over the past several decades teaches military planners the value of early NCA guidance for planning. A certain degree of civil-military misunderstanding during crisis and conflict is understandable. Artificial separation of civilian and military leaders during peacetime planning compounds those difficulties. It threatens to overload the decision systems with uncertainty and disagreement at the very moment consensus is most necessary. For that reason, military planners seek an early and positive contribution by civilian decisionmakers—at the highest levels.

- *Iterative development:* While top down guidance for military planners is necessary, it is not a panacea. Increasingly, military leaders recognize their responsibility to provide civilian authorities with the

implications of their guidance and the *consequences* of adapting military operations to objectives the civilian leadership establishes. Only in this way can we be sure that the military purposes to which military forces are directed meet the political intentions of the NCA. Such interaction ensures understanding of the political limitations imposed on our use of military resources. This iterative "feedback" process is time-consuming, but essential.

- *Broad concept planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); detailed planning by commanders in chief (CINCs):* In essence, the JCS, as directed by the NCA, provides broad, general guidance to the CINCs, focusing on intertheater employment and prioritization issues. The growing global challenge posed by the Soviets and their surrogates demands that the JCS play a more active role in coordinating military actions among the CINCs. On the other hand, specified and unified commanders must reinvigorate their traditional theater planning roles, under JCS oversight, for their areas of responsibility.

A Model Planning Process

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the interaction of all levels in the defense planning process.

- *Guidance:* The point of origin for an effective military planning system is a mechanism to provide timely and authoritative guidance for military planners.

- *Military advice:* Civilian policymakers require military inputs regarding the nature of current and emerging threats, US and allied capabilities, and special considerations regarding the sequence and timing of prehostility actions required to deter or counter particular threats. The JCS provides these inputs through formal and informal procedures in consultation with the services and unified and specified commanders. Of particular value to civilian authorities are military judgments regarding the risks associated with individual operations plans and with the capacity of our collective plans to meet a general war threat. These judgments contribute to more effective allocation of near-term resources.

- *Civilian/Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy:* Effective civilian direction requires an authoritative statement of planning policies, resource assumptions and political objectives upon which to base military planning. Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning is a formal Department of Defense document providing near-term guidance

A Model for Defense Planning



Figure 1

for operational planning. The intent is to ensure that military contingency planning reflects existing capabilities and valid assumptions and that it addresses contingencies considered vital by national command authorities.

• *Guidance translation:* Once civilian authorities establish planning guidance, the JCS translates that guidance into military terms for use by the CINCs. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is their principal

vehicle and establishes military objectives for the CINCs, provides broad employment concepts and allocates military forces among theaters.

- *Objectives-resource alignment:* What we would like to achieve must conform with what we are capable of achieving—at least in the near-term. For that reason, the JCS and the CINCs engage in a continuous process of aligning military objectives with currently available resources. Critical variables are force adequacy (Can assigned missions be accomplished within available resources?) for deployability and sustainability. These variables are illustrated in Figure 1 as "Missions-Resources 'Fit.'"

Obviously, the JCS must return to the NCA for additional guidance if assigned objectives cannot be achieved through modification of employment concepts or reallocation of forces ("Feedback" in the model). Feedback is so important in the planning process that it deserves special emphasis to assure we surface issues and secure decisions necessary to align objectives with capabilities and assure our military plans conform to the political intentions of those ultimately responsible for their execution. The planning process must provide civilian authorities a statement of our most pressing resource needs to meet today's threats. Concurrently, the mid and longer term planning process surfaces requirements to handle tomorrow's threats.

- *Contingency planning:* The model for defense planning focuses on contingency planning based on current and budgeted forces. This bottom line level of planning deals with success or failure to meet challenges to our security interests and "how much is enough." Near-term operational planning for plausible military contingencies requires a methodology that is also useful for identifying future capabilities needed to achieve overall objectives with acceptable risk.

Methodology for Regional Force Planning

An approach or methodology was evolved to improve regional force planning. It is necessarily general for application in a variety of possible circumstances and is comprised of three basic steps shown in Figure 2.

- *Background factors for regional analysis:* First, we analyze each region in terms of:

Mission: An explicit statement of what needs to be done to achieve our overall objective.

Forces: Levels, mix and types of forces allocated to the planning task.

Area: Geographical and physical environment, to include anticipated threats.

Command and control: Organizational procedures for controlling the application of military force, whether US unilateral forces or combined forces in a coalition framework.

In short, this first step of analysis is aimed at identifying basic tasks and the framework within which objectives are to be achieved.

- *Regional military requirements matrix:* Second, we must evaluate essential functions and elements of capabilities to derive regional military requirements fundamental to prepare and successfully engage in

A Methodology for Regional Force Planning

I. Regional Analysis in Terms of:
- — Mission
  - — Forces
    - — Area
      - — Command and control

II. Development of Regional Military Requirements

	Equipment	Personnel	Doctrine	Organization	Cost
Mobilization					
Training					
Deployment					
Employment					
Sustainability					

III. Regional Force Development Planning
- — Regional requirements
  - — Current capabilities
    - — Identified deficiencies
      - — Corrective programs

Figure 2

conflict. Functions we must perform that are analyzed in this second step are:

Mobilization: Whether partial or full and, if partial, how allocated among the services.

Training: Scenario-specific training requirements to operate and survive in a particular environment against a particular threat.

Deployment: The most effective combination of airlift, sealift and pre-positioned materiel to provide closure of US forces in a timely manner.

Employment: The concept for employing military force, type force and accompanying operational techniques tailored to the environment for maximum combat effectiveness.

Sustainability: The ability to maintain materiel effectiveness and sustain combat operations in an enduring conflict.

Each of these essential functions is performed with levels of capability and resourcing in terms of *equipment, personnel, doctrine, organization* and *resource costs.* The functions are most frequently analyzed in sequence starting with mobilization or deployment and ending with sustainability. However, a useful technique is *backward planning* which starts with employment and sustainability required for the mission. Such analysis leads naturally to evaluation of deployment, training and mobilization in sequence as the essential features of each are further clarified.

In summary, the analytical framework for regional force planning proposes a sequence of planning with included factors and levels for evaluation to determine military requirements to achieve specific objectives. The result is to provide integrity to the process of answering "how much is enough."

Appraisal

Contingency plans must be tested using war gaming or other appropriate analytical tools to simulate the problems, exercise plans and determine likely outcomes. In accomplishing this appraisal, the input factors outlined in Figure 2 are fixed at realistic levels, and outputs are formulated to produce the statistics for analysis and surface insights that arise in the course of the exercise.

Participants in the contingency planning seminar at the US Army War

College were afforded the use of an interactive, computer-assisted war game to test plans they developed. This permitted analysis in sufficient depth for planners to evaluate their own plans in terms of decisions, outcomes and priorities that may have been contentious or counter-intuitive. A computer modeling approach facilitates analysis and forms the basis for risk assessment, corrective programs and feedback to make the process iterative and vital. The process is a continuing one that addresses the postulated threat, ensures that plans and programs anticipate needs, and contributes to mid and long-term planning and force development.

Lessons Learned

Thorough evaluation of the lessons learned from this exercise continues. An interim assessment includes:

- *Overview of the contingency planning process:*

Requires interaction between OSD planning guidance, JCS and theater contingency planning, and force planning.

Political objectives must be known and understood by military planners.

Clear channels of communication must be available to planners.

Requires commanders to challenge guidance if they do not agree.

Army leaders must challenge assumptions, intelligence estimates, terrain evaluation, missions and tasks.

The plan is not complete until all of the issues have been addressed.

- *Principles of war:*

Principles of war are not immutable, but they are a relevant consideration in contingency planning.

As a minimum, violation must be recognized and justified.

The classic principles are shown in Figure 3, and the US Army War College outgrowth is shown in Figure 4.

- *Levels of planning:*

Nine Principles of War

- Objective
- Unity of Command
- Economy of force
- Offensive
- Mass
- Security
- Surprise
- Maneuver
- Simplicity

Figure 3

National level requires consideration of political/military objectives, general military missions and courses of action, and an understanding of broad constraints and limitations.

Theater level requires a more detailed assessment of factors: military objectives, area characteristics, resources, force employment concepts, deployment considerations and logistical requirements.

US Army War College Matrix

Alternatives / Elements	Force Heavy	Firepower Heavy	Indigenous Heavy	Nuclear Heavy	Other
Objective					
Initiative					
Flexibility					
Concentration					
Economy					
Maneuver					
Surprise					
Exploitation					
Security					
Simplicity					
Unity					
Morale					
Indirect approach					

Figure 4

Testing through exercises and gaming identifies shortfalls with related policy implications and force planning issues.

Broader issues of where we go eventually and how we handle a broader war, while largely played at the NCA and JCS level, do have tentacles into operational planning.

- *Backward planning:* Backward planning techniques were found to be useful, starting with required employment and sustainability to accomplish the mission; then planning back through deployment, training and mobilization.

- *Uncertainties:*

In planning for deployment, the problem of not knowing when the war will start is a special complication which drives the entire employment concept and force selection. If you would rather deter but are willing to fight—and you do not know when the war will start—you are torn between a more readily deployed force of some capability to confront and a really credible fighting force. The issue is not "How much is enough?," but, rather, "What can we do and when?"

Do not overlook host nation support and worldwide resource availability, but recognize the risk in counting on host nation support in plans.

Variable assumptions and high uncertainty associated with contingency planning precludes mechanistic or "cookbook" solutions. While the approach can be systematic, it must allow for the continuous exchange of ideas and information between senior and subordinate headquarters and staffs. Personal involvement of an imaginative and innovative commander is extremely important.

- *Lift assets:*

We routinely focus on strategic lift and seldom on intratheater lift. Yet the problem of moving forces within the theater is at least as important.

The interdependency of lift capability, combat capability and logistics, to include resupply and related tradeoffs, dominates developing employment and deployment concepts.

- *Force design:* Forces must be balanced and complementary: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines; intelligence, combat support, command, control and communications, and so forth. Balance does not mean equal; the guide is to optimize total force combat power, mission and timing.

- *Contingency planning instruction:* The US Army War College and the US Army and Command and General Staff College will each institute a course on contingency planning. In the meantime, senior commanders must fill the void by conducting appropriate instruction in the field.

Message

The contingency planning discipline is crucial to the way we meet challenges to national security in today's global environment. Training and experience are presently inadequate. Progress cannot wait for publications, curricula, computer models and isolated exercises in contingency planning. The process must be practiced and improved using available information and analytical tools with an eye open for innovative ideas, practical procedures, flexibility and foresight in a tough world environment which offers as many opportunities as challenges. MR

Retirees Receive Call. In the event of a full mobilization, Army retirees will play a key role. The Army hopes to preassign all qualified Regular Army retirees and certain retired Reserve volunteers to active duty installations within the Continental United States. They will be issued orders telling them when and where to report in the event of a full mobilization to assist in the efficient operation of stateside installations while permitting reassignment of active duty soldiers for deployment or tasks inappropriate for retired personnel.

The Army began a pilot mobilization preassignment program last year by issuing preassignment orders to 1,102 Regular Army retirees in an attempt to find out retirees' reactions and help determine policy requirements and operational details for the total mobilization system. Also, the US Army Forces Command began a Retired Voluntary Recall Pilot Program in April 1980 to provide premobilization assignments to volunteer Regular and Reserve retirees living near Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Riley, Kansas.

Those retirees who have responded to the US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center concerning the preassignment program ask many questions, but seem supportive of the new program. Many want to be recalled immediately and serve a period of active duty now and not be called to active duty again until a full mobilization is called.

Retirees share a sense of need, both for the Army and of the Army's need for them, and they seem willing to make the sacrifice one more time.

The Army's Ethical Dilemma

Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel)
Malcolm J. Brummitt, US Army

The author identifies a dilemma confronting today's Army. He describes what he perceives to be the ingredients of this problem and proposes an initial step toward its solution.

THE Army, in its public relations and advertising schemes, promotes an individualistic, self-centered, egoist ethic, yet still expects soldiers to display an attitude of service, dedication and selflessness to the mission of the unit. The Army tends to divorce the more nagging, fluid, personnel problems from the dilemma cast when it cloaks its traditional system of values in a costume designed to make it look like a beneficent parent. It appears that there is little or no connection between fewer accessions, higher attrition, middle career dropout, unit cohesion and readiness on the one hand and, on the other hand, the primrose path ethic the Army projects to fill quotas.

The upshot of all this is *the Army's ethical dilemma.*

The creation of the volunteer force has most frequently been pinpointed as the beginning of the Army's split in traditional values. Since 1975, numerous articles have described fundamental changes that have wreaked havoc on the Army's structure. Few of those analyzing change offer a positive diagnosis but, rather, put forth a variety of temporary remedies.

Some writers think officer leadership is the primary problem. They say we are not producing the Patton, Marshall and Eisenhower quality. Others attribute the crux of the problem to a management technology which best fits the corporate world. Still others lament a perceived deterioration of the Army's long-held traditions, folkways and customs and feel the cement of the institution is developing cracks. Richard A. Gabriel writing the "Point of View" in *The New York Times* said:

As soon as members of a combat unit see themselves as pursuing a 'job' instead of a 'vocation,' see themselves as 'managers' instead of 'leaders' and begin to 'fulfill the system's norms' instead of 'doing their duty,' then the basic cement that holds military units together begins to crack.[1]

Leadership is undoubtedly the key element in building a strong Army, but can it really be argued that leaders are not as good as they were? There have been good leaders and poor leaders in every military generation, and there is neither reason nor data to support a hypothesis that the ratio has somehow been altered. Since the crucible for proven military leadership is the battlefield, our younger developing leaders are untested.

On the other side of the ledger, our leaders today know that peacetime training is tough. To "pump up" whole units of men and women who see no impending national crisis is a significant test of leadership capability. Peacetime posture has its own way of weeding out those who are not military leadership material. Those with the fundamental qualities of military leadership stay around. The Army is producing a quality of leadership equal to any time in its history. Ineffective leadership is not the Army's major problem.

Other writers, including a number of military sociologists, have warned that there are potential pitfalls along the new management technology path. Attempting to mix a corporate management technology with a service-oriented institution, they say, is like trying to mix oil and water.

Much has been said about the institutional versus the corporate model of management being the root cause of the Army's ethical dilemma. The dilemma is thought to surface as soldiers feel the pressure of being confronted with two value systems pulling in opposite directions. The Army is not just another job, they say, but a principled, rigid, disciplined, often undemocratic institution entrusted with the mission of serving the defense needs of the country. It is believed that two value systems on a collision course will reap nothing but disordered functioning and disintegration.

Management technology is paramount to what the Army can deliver in the future. As the international political maze, the mission, training and logistics all become more complex, better management systems have got to be developed. But is this really the fundamental issue gnawing at the Army? The Army has always had to find a way to manage its resources. Does it follow that a change in management practices is necessarily going to have a deleterious effect on the institution?

There is a third group of writers who tie the Army's dilemma to the loss of its traditional roles, values and customs. What, they ask, happened to those concepts like duty, honor, integrity and discipline? With the deterioration of these values, they contend that the Army is no longer the bastion in the midst of a sea of the situational ethic tormenting American society today. The "whatever turns you on," egoist ethic has invaded and eaten away the Army's ability to form effective, cohesive units that will stand up in combat, they say. In 1977, *A Review of Education and Training for Officers* stated:

The Army needs to reaffirm itself unequivocally as constituting a way of life, a profession, a calling and not a job. Without such reaffirmation and officership—indeed 'Duty-Honor-Country'—are doomed with what could be viewed as potential tragic consequences for our nation.[2]

That the thoughts and desires of soldiers revolve around work satisfaction, reward, adequate compensation and convenient work hours elicits no argument. Today's soldiers hold the values that pervade our society. Do we really expect soldiers to think differently in this respect? If traditional values are deteriorating, can the deterioration honestly and thoughtfully be attributed to the desire for increased benefits?

The answers for the Army's dilemma cannot be found in effective leadership, the choice of management technologies or in eroding values. The circumstances the Army is encountering are not so much centered in the *substance* of change as in the *process* used to initiate it.

The processes which have brought about change were set in motion with the inception of the volunteer force. Maintaining this force made filling quotas and getting the needed share of the "manpower market" a primary process. The process is highly complex, and selling the product is paramount. How do you make the military machine appealing for young men and women to want to "buy" into an enlistment? With the many benefits once accompanying enlistment eroding, the Army proceeded to clothe itself in a neat, streamlined, corporate look. The day-to-day realities displaying the tough routine and the dirt and grime of training somehow escaped the cameras.

The mission and practices characteristic of military life are nowhere to be found in the advertising. Slick and misleading advertising has caused consternation and confusion with enlisted and officer alike and has impacted on every phase of Army life. Carefully and colorfully planted desired expectations do not change the bold facts of what the Army is and the awesome responsibility dictated by its readiness mission.

The issue is not that leadership, management and the values of the Army have changed, but indeed that these areas have remained essentially the same while new public relation packages have been bought. This is the heart of the dilemma. A breach has widened between what the Army is and what it appears to be in 30-second television commercials. Young people learn very quickly that the Army is not the "good life," and neither may it be a "job" with the "promise of a future."

What is the net result for creating this kind of dilemma? First-term attrition rates climb. Women caught up in a predominately male culture leave at an even faster rate. The promises of creature comforts, money and educational opportunities do not balance the scale of confusion brought on by masking a set of values that ultimately mean life and death.

Few people can endure the pressure of a mixed message for long periods. From under the facade of "special offers" comes the stark reality of an Army that is hellbent on forwarding and reaching its objectives in essentially the same manner it has since 1775. The course of events from this point on is well-known to Army leaders. First-term soldiers are "counseled," moved from job to job and passed from unit to unit to attempt "rehabilitation" before the inevitable "expeditious discharge."

"Middle managers" become weary of being told to accomplish the mission while processing an Army of nomads. Leaders become disenchanted, preaching institutional values which, for soldiers, appear to be incongruent with the Army's behavior. The uncertainty and frustration of living in this kind of environment forces leaders to quit before too much time has been invested.

To counter the movement out and to slow the critical loss of leaders, new programs are piled on top of old ones. Greater incentives are offered. Palliatives such as more stable hours, some uniform accouterments, promising increased command flexibility, decentralizing authority are implemented. The moves that are devised seem endless, but few serve to reduce, let alone touch, the core of the problem. Good plans, courageous leadership and superior weapons count for little if troops are disheartened or demoralized.

A dilemma is "a situation involving choice between equally unsatisfactory alternatives—a problem seemingly incapable of a satisfactory solution."[3] Persons faced with a dilemma usually feel demoralized. Demoralization causes disordered thinking and leads inherently to a low state of morale. Almost all dilemmas, then, are ethical in nature.

The purpose and mission of the Army are too important to the United States to continue this position. Since the process used to build the All-Volunteer Force is firmly entrenched, changes are costly. The fact is that the present Army message is inconsistent with its mission statement. What is the cure for this dilemma? It is old, it is tested and it is a credible statement—tell it like it is. It is only the first step in solving the Army's ethical dilemma, but it is the crucial one.

NOTES

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2 *A Review of Education and Training for Officers*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., Volume V, p N-1-13.

3 *Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language*, World Publishing Co., N.Y., 1966.

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A problem common to most volunteer armies, and particularly the US Army today, is the recruitment and retention of soldiers, notably for the combat arms. The British army has traditionally relied on its regimental system, with its concept of regional affiliation and single regiment career patterns, to counter the problem of providing a more personal approach in the key areas of recruiting and career management. This somewhat paternalistic attitude assists with retention by giving combat arms soldiers a sense of regimental belonging to compensate for the lack of the more obvious job satisfaction found in the more technical arms and services. This article examines the role and organization of the system as it is today and suggests possible future application of some aspects to the US combat arms.

Introduction

WITH the change to the Modern Volunteer Army, the US Army has experienced problems in recruiting and retaining the quantity and quality of combat arms personnel required to man all units properly. The problem is compounded by personnel turbulence that breaks up long-term training, unit cohesiveness and combat readiness.

The same problem faces all volunteer armies which must compete with busi-

A Look at the British Regimental System

Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. B. Watson, British Army

ness and industry to recruit from a narrowing pool of qualified school-leavers and, having recruited the individuals, to provide sufficient job satisfaction to retain them. In the United Kingdom, the primary combat arms (armor and infantry) have traditionally been organized on a regimental basis to help manage this problem. This article explains the current working of the British Regimental System, with particular reference to an infantry regiment, The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment), and suggests possible applications of some aspects of the system to the US Army's combat arms.

Background

The regimental system has formed the basis of the British army from the formation of the standing army at the restoration of King Charles II in 1660. The system has always been administrative rather than operational. In this way, it has differed from the Continental and US systems in which the regiment was usually a tactical grouping of three or more battalions working together. Historically, battalions from the same British regiment seldom served together although their members were linked by such bonds as a common recruiting area, uniform, training depot and the cross-posting of individuals.

In 1881, under reforms brought in by Viscount E. Cardwell, the secretary of state for war, each infantry regiment was established at two active battalions and one or more Territorial Army (TA), or reserve, battalions. Each regiment was also allocated a firm geographical recruiting area. Permanent depots for training recruits on a regimental basis were built in these areas.[1] This system survived until

after World War II when, with the contraction of the army, most regiments lost their active second battalions.

The most recent major change occurred with the ending of National Service (conscription) in the late 1950s when individual infantry regiments were grouped under (nonoperational) brigade, and later division, organizations. These divisions perform the old regimental functions across a wider, and more cost-effective, span of active battalions. These named divisions, such as The Scottish Division, have no operational command role and should not be confused with numbered or operational formations such as the 1st Armored Division.

The Present System

The 50 current regular (active) and 38 reserve battalions of British infantry are organized into six divisions reflecting either geographical areas (Scottish) or historic roles (Guards). In addition, three active and three reserve battalions, recruited countrywide, form The Parachute Regiment for which the airborne role is reserved. Each division has a small staff headed by a serving brigadier whose responsibilities include overall career planning for officers and soldiers; coordination of divisional recruiting efforts; supervision of recruit training at the training depots; some limited responsibilities toward TA battalions, including assistance with recruit training; and, finally, coordination of divisional and regimental affairs.[2]

In the case of The Scottish Division, this responsibility covers the geographical area of Scotland, with seven regular and five TA battalions. From the recruiting point of view, Scotland is also the specified recruiting area for two armored battalions, two artillery battalions, two battalions of Scots Guards (infantry in the Guards Division) and, of course, all other branches of the army, plus the navy and air force. With a population of some five million to recruit from, the competition is fierce.

The Regiment

Each division contains a number of regiments. These regiments vary in size from one to five battalions of mixed active and TA units.

At the head of the regiment is the colonel of the regiment. The colonel is a distinguished serving or retired officer of the regiment whose normal tenure of appointment is five years. He is looked upon as the guardian of regimental traditions and links. He takes a very close interest in all aspects of regimental life, not only the active elements, but also such groups as associations of former members, clubs, cities and towns in the regimental area, charities and funds. While the colonels hold honorary appointments with no financial reimbursement other than some traveling expenses, they traditionally look upon their appointments as great personal honors and devote considerable effort and enthusiasm to their tasks.

At the center of regimental life, there exists a regimental headquarters (RHQ) whose functions are:

. . . to assist the Colonel of the Regiment in accordance with his charter and to coordinate regimental affairs as the focal point of the Regiment's activities. RHQ are responsible to Divisional Headquarters.[3]

The RHQ is manned by a small staff, usually consisting of one or two retired of-

ficers, a secretary and a museum attendant. The role is as follows:

To provide a focal point within the traditional regimental area for all regular and territorial battalions and cadet units and to foster regimental and territorial connections with civil authorities, schools, affiliated regiments, allied Commonwealth units and local press, TV and radio.[4]

Additional responsibilities include active officer and soldier recruiting for both regular and TA elements of the regiment; conducting regimental benevolent policy; disseminating regimental news through regimental magazines and newsletters; and collecting, maintaining and displaying historical records and trophies of the regiment, usually in a regimental museum. The RHQ provides a permanent regimental base located within the regimental area. Through its many contacts, together with the work of retired members of the regiment, the RHQ ensures that the people of the area know their regiment.

Regimental clubs and associations play an important role in fostering regimental spirit among former members of regiments. They also play an important, although indirect, role in recruiting as they provide links to sons and grandsons and may well influence them to join their families' regiments.

The Active Element

Today, the active element of The Royal Scots consists of one battalion and those officers and soldiers at extraregimental employment who fill posts at staff, at training establishments, with the TA or recruiting. In The Scottish Division, of seven active battalions, each battalion can have a different operational role. At any given time, some battalions of the division might be organized as mechanized, and others as light (airmobile) battalions.

Recruiting

Although recruiting is conducted on an armywide basis, divisional and regimental efforts are highly important. A Regimental Careers Opportunity Team, consisting of an officer, a senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) (E5 to E9) and three or four of the very best junior NCOs or private soldiers (E2 to E4), is manned from within each battalion. Each team is based in its regimental area with a jeep and caravan, and it tours its area, visiting and becoming involved with schools, youth clubs, cadet units, local fairs and similar gatherings of "customers."

Considerable assistance is, for instance, given to youth clubs with expeditions, sports training and similar military-oriented activities. The aim is to "promote the Regiment and meet potential recruits."[5] When a team member has identified an individual who is interested, he then passes him along to the Army Recruiting Organization for testing and enlistment procedures.

The efforts of the regimental teams are backed by a small divisional team, together with the "Golden Lions," the divisional free-fall parachuting team, which performs at major public occasions. The team draws its members from the best free fallers throughout the division. The team's performance at major military and civilian events, such as the equivalent of state fairs, provides good public relations for the division as a whole. The "Golden Lions" team is self-supporting from

charges made for civilian performances.

In addition, where possible, active battalions send platoon or company-size groups to the regimental areas to work in support of their career teams. These groups train in local areas, put on displays or work on projects which are normally associated with environmental improvement. The aim is to "Keep the Army in the Public Eye (KAPE)" and, particularly, the regiment in the local eye.[6]

The overall army recruiting effort and actual enlistment remain the responsibility of the Army Recruiting Organization. The aim of divisional and regimental recruiting is to help the division by identifying and encouraging more recruits. Soldiers recruited into a regiment from the same general area usually have common interests, accents and backgrounds. They will sometimes have come from the same school or village and will often support the same sports teams.

This all helps to establish and maintain unit cohesiveness, loyalty and a sense of regimental identity. In turn, it tightens the bonds between the regiment and its area. Furthermore, the local press is more interested in local people and will run

Her Royal Highness, the Princess Anne, presenting new colors to the 1st Battalion, The Royal Scots, in 1980

more public relations stories which, in turn, help the regimental recruiting effort. The net result is a well-manned, well-motivated division.

The best recruiter is often the satisfied soldier. Soldiers coming from a common geographical area are actively encouraged to pass on names of interested friends to the Careers Team which then visits and talks to them. Good young soldiers are also attached, normally at the end of recruit training, to the regimental career teams for a week at a time. During this week, they visit their old schools, clubs, and so forth, and talk to people they know with the aim of describing their new chosen career. Finally, visits to battalions are arranged for groups of potential recruits to see what the life is like. These visits can last from a day to a week. Each visitor is paired with a young soldier to share his life during the visit rather than disrupting the battalion program by presenting what are often overawing lectures and displays.

Officer recruiting is done in a similar manner although on a much smaller scale. It is handled at regimental level by the RHQ. Potential officers are encouraged to visit regular battalions for a week, at the army's expense, both to see the units for themselves and for the battalions to assess the individuals. Acceptance of an officer for a regiment is still the prerogative of the colonel of the regiment. An officer (or soldier) joins a regiment for the whole of his service to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and each regiment, coming from a different part of the country, has certain unique qualities. The colonel of the regiment, with his background and experience stretching over many years, is in the best position to ensure that an individual will both fit in and be happy within a particular regiment.

Training and Career Management

The aim of recruit training is to:

. . . train the recruit in the fundamental attributes and skills of the infantry soldier, with particular emphasis on skill-at-arms, so that he can take his place in a section [squad] after acclimatisation and special to theatre[7] training as necessary.[8]

During recruit training, a recruit wears the uniform of his particular regiment but trains at a divisional depot, staffed from all the regiments of the division, alongside recruits from other regiments. His syllabus includes training on all infantry weapons; fieldcraft and minor tactics; nuclear, biological and chemical warfare; radio; first aid; and physical training. Specialist training for a mechanized, airmobile or other role takes place on joining his battalion. During his training, the recruit learns the history and traditions of his own regiment.

Career management for soldiers rests very much with the commanding officer of active battalions working with one of two central record offices which covers a number of infantry divisions. The commanding officer usually takes advice from company commanders and the regimental sergeant major (E9) who is the senior "soldier" in the battalion. The aim is for a young soldier to spend his first three years in the same rifle platoon learning his basic job. Thereafter, he can expect to be promoted and to broaden his military experience by attendance at unit and School of Infantry courses. Current average times for promotion are eight years to sergeant (E5 to E6) and 15 years to company sergeant major (E8). The emphasis for promotion for a more senior soldier is placed on merit and potential versus straight seniority.

A soldier, with a few exceptions in the training organizations, expects to spend all his service, up to the rank of sergeant, with his battalion. Afterward, he can expect to spend about one-third to one-half of his time in employments outside the battalion. While it is unusual for soldiers to serve with battalions other than the one they joined, they can volunteer or, if necessary, be ordered to serve with other battalions of the division when required for operational, manning, personal or career reasons.

On completion of cadet training, a young officer will usually spend three years with his battalion commanding a rifle platoon, followed by two years either as a specialist platoon commander in the battalion or as a training platoon commander at a depot. Afterward, his service to the rank of lieutenant colonel will alternate every two to three years between tours of duty with the battalion in such posts as battalion staff, company executive officer and company commander, and tours at staff or other extraregimental employment posts.

Finally, if he is fortunate, he may return as a lieutenant colonel at the age of 38 to 41 for a two and one-half-year tour to command a battalion he has served some 10 to 12 years with over the previous 18 to 21 years. He knows the battalion, its senior NCOs, its strengths and its weaknesses. In turn, the majority of the battalion know him as an individual and what he will expect of them during his command tour.

Retention

Retention is as important to the British army as to the US Army. Skills learned over a number of years cannot be replaced by recruiting new soldiers. The very close-knit, rather paternalistic organization of the regimental system, which encourages commanders to take a close interest in their juniors as individuals, supports retention goals. A soldier and his family are encouraged to look upon the regiment as his home where his interests will be looked after and his qualities recognized in a more personal manner than in "the army" as a whole. The key to good retention is the leadership that results in job satisfaction. While outside factors, such as pay, obviously affect a soldier's attitude, he will usually extend his service if he feels he is doing a worthwhile job, is appreciated and is a part of a team.

The Territorial Army

The Territorial Army corresponds to both the US Army Reserve and Army National Guard in the federal role. It is an all-volunteer force integrated with the active force into a "one-army" concept. Some 70 percent of the reinforcement mobilization of the West Germany-based 1st British Corps is provided by formed TA units. The Scottish Division includes five TA battalions. The active element of the division supports these battalions in training and, if necessary, in operations by providing commanding officers (although these can be TA officers) and battalion executive and staff officers.

In addition, each battalion has an active regimental sergeant major (E9) and about 12 sergeants or warrant officers to assist with training and administration. These posts not only improve the operational effectiveness of reserve units, but also help to tie in the active with the reserve (TA) elements of the regiment and, through the civilian members of the

TA, the community of the regimental area as a whole. These tours provide active officers and senior NCOs with a tour of duty in their home area which often leads to greater job satisfaction and motivation.

Operational Role

An important aspect of the British Regimental System is the achievement of battalionwide unity and continuity. This unity would be lost if an individual posting system such as that found in the US Army took place. Equally, if a battalion were to remain in one place in one role throughout its existence, enthusiasm and motivation would soon decrease. To avoid this, complete battalions are rotated through locations or roles approximately every four years. Therefore, an infantry battalion might serve four years in England in an airmobile role.

During the last six to nine months of that period, the battalion would convert to the mechanized role before moving to join the 1st British Corps in Germany for four years. At the end of that period, it may move to Northern Ireland for two years and then from there to Xianggang for two years, with internal security roles in both places. These moves of the personnel of a unit and their families provide variety of employment and location.

A squad of The Royal Scots dismounting from their armored personnel carrier when in the mechanized role in 1971

There may be a lack of operational effectiveness when a new unit arrives in-theater to relieve an experienced one. However, this is less detrimental than the lack of continuity and long-term training experienced through the continuous turnover in an individually posted unit.

Current US Combat Arms Regimental System

From time to time, the US Army has looked at the British Regimental System to see which aspects might be suitable for adoption. A major study, approved by the secretary of the Army on 24 January 1957, planned:

. . . to provide a flexible regimental structure that would permit perpetuation of unit history and tradition in the [then] new [ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions)] tactical organization of divisions.[9]

The study proposed that certain regiments with distinguished records should be designated as parent regiments for all Active Army, Reserve and National Guard combat units, less armored cavalry regiments. In 1959, it was decided that cavalry regiments should retain their historic three-squadron structure. The study's second main suggestion was for "the establishment of parent regimental headquarters at permanent CONUS [Continental United States] locations, and the assignment of various support functions to them."[10]

The first suggestion was implemented by 1961 by designating a number of historic regiments as the parent regiments to all battalions of combat arms. The sec-

The crew of a 120mm antitank gun manhandle it to a firing position after being dropped by a *Puma* helicopter when The Royal Scots were in the light role in 1979

Photos courtesy of author

ond, more solid suggestion was not implemented for a variety of reasons, including budget and manpower restraints and the belief that establishing the system would cause too big an administrative problem for the Army. The proposal has been reviewed both formally by the Department of the Army (DA) and informally in magazine articles since then. Currently, some aspects of a regimental system are again being actively considered as evidenced by an article in the *Army Times* of 15 September 1980 in which a DA official is quoted as saying:

The Army could begin designating regiments—at least for the purpose of designating distinctive uniform items—long before a true (British-style) regimental system is established.[11]

General Edward C. Meyer, chief of staff of the US Army, was quoted as saying that trainees would be authorized to wear unit patches in training and that plans were being considered to keep soldiers in the same company throughout a three-year enlistment. The extension of command tours to two to three years and the planned rotation of two squadrons of the 5th Cavalry between the European Command and CONUS are further examples of current thought.

Possible Future Applications

A recent paper by the United Kingdom and Canadian liaison officers to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)[12] made a detailed study of some aspects of the British Commonwealth system and suggested how these could be incorporated in the US Army. Many of their major recommendations have been written about in articles in US military journals over the last 20 years.

In supporting regional affiliations of regiments, the paper suggests a grouping of regiments from all combat arms by state or states sufficient to ensure a minimum population base of five million supporting four regiments. A further, more detailed study would be required to adjust the base figure to relate to national recruiting trends. Monte F. Bourjaily, writing in *Army* in 1961, discussed this idea and suggested that such an identification could create in an area "an image of the regiment that could not fail to improve community and public relations for the whole Army."[13]

Regional recruiting, the TRADOC paper says, would "require adjustments to current District Recruiting Command boundaries to bring them into line with regional state boundaries."[14] The liaison officers suggest that regiments should actively recruit only within their own areas and should supply recruiting personnel as part of the US Army Recruiting Command in these regions. In each region, the RHQ should be established, possibly collocated for economic reasons for all regiments from a region, and colonels of regiments should be authorized. The paper does not support a change to the current, centralized recruit training system.

Developing a theory on "New Regiments, New Divisions" in *Military Review* in May 1972, John P. West III and William K. West had this to say:

Each of the new regiments would possess an administrative . . . headquarters located on a small post; it would draw most of its personnel from the geographical area in which the post was located.[15]

They continue later in the same article:

The new regiments would provide a home for the soldier in several senses. They would provide unit and geographical identity on a scale sufficiently small

to be meaningful to the individual and his family; they would reduce the impersonality of the Army personnel system and make possible more meaningful career planning.[16]

Raymond E. Bell, writing in *Armor* in 1972, suggested that battalion headquarters at advanced individual and basic combat training centers should be designated as depot (regimental) headquarters of Combat Arms Regimental System regiments and should include:

. . . a retired commissioned or noncommissioned officer custodian to take care of protocol, trophies, ceremonies, and regimental matters. Designate a colonel of the regiment—a distinguished retired officer.[17]

This last point had also been stressed by Bourjaily in 1961 when he wrote:

There is no reason why a regiment should not have a honorary colonel. A conscientious regimental colonel could strive to assure that his regiment's tactical elements know the meaning of their (regimental) membership.[18]

The TRADOC paper recommends that personnel management practices and procedures should become more regimentally oriented for both promotion and posting, with commanding officers playing an important role in selecting enlisted personnel for extraregimental employment assignments.[19] More personal attention to individuals could lead to better retention rates.

A detailed plan for unit rotation, based on the types and locations of combat arms battalions in December 1979, is also included. This plan suggests that it would be possible for combat arms units to alternate approximately every three years between CONUS and overseas tours.[20]

The posting of active officers and senior noncommissioned officers to Army Reserve and National Guard units has recently been agreed upon and is being implemented now. This can only lead to an improvement in the One-Army concept. Looking to the future, these assignments could be linked by regions to particular combat arms regiments and perhaps extended to linking support and service support battalions to particular regions to strengthen Active and Reserve unit links.

Conclusions

The efficiency and morale of fighting men are greatly heightened by pride in the unit to which they belong; and that [sic] this pride, in large part, springs from the past achievements of that unit, as embodied in its traditions, battle records and battle honors.[21]

The above quotation comes not from some dusty British regimental history, but from *The Army Almanac* published in 1957. With little or no real political support for a return to the draft, the Modern Volunteer Army appears to be here to stay. Some aspects of the British Regimental System, by giving soldiers a greater sense of unit identity, may help to solve the current problem of recruiting and retention in the US combat arms.

NOTES

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2 *Charter for Divisional Brigadiers of Divisions of Infantry*, Ministry of Defence, London, Eng., 6 May 1976.

3 *Regimental Headquarters*, Ministry of Defence, London, Eng., 17 January 1979, p 1.

4 *Ibid.*, p 2.

5 *Standing Orders for Regimental Recruiting Teams of The Scottish Division*, Headquarters, The Scottish Division, Edinburgh, Scot., 9 January 1976, p 1.

6 *Ibid.*, p 2.
7 "Special to theatre" is additional mandatory training for all soldiers moving to a theater of operations. An example is attendance at a Northern Ireland Recruit Training Course during the current emergency.
8 *Directive for Recruit Training*, Headquarters, Director of Infantry, Warminster, Eng., February 1977, p 1.
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10 *Ibid.*
11 "Massive Changes Aim at Unit Esprit," *Army Times*, 15 September 1980, p 1.
12 Lieutenant Colonel P. W. Faith and Lieutenant Colonel D. I. Ross, *Application of the Regimental System to the United States Army's Combat Arms*, Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va., April 1980.
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14 Faith and Ross, *op. cit.*, p 40.
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16 *Ibid.*
17 Raymond E. Bell, "Another Step Forward With CARS," *Armor*, September-October 1972, p 36.
18 Bourjaily, *op. cit.*
19 Faith and Ross, *op. cit.*, p 42.
20 Ibid., p 41.
21 *The Army Almanac*, Second Edition, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, Pa., 1957, p 132.

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Attack Helicopter Reaches Speed of 3gs. The US Army's new *YAH64* advanced attack helicopter (*MR*, Jun 1980, p 81) has reached a speed of nearly 237 miles per hour (206 knots). The new top speed was achieved as one of the final data points in the aerodynamic flight envelope expansion program that has now been successfully completed.

The light, but extremely rugged, structure of the *YAH64* was proven during the flight envelope expansion when maneuvers of more than 3gs were demonstrated from 80 knots to 164 knots (one g is equal to the weight of an aircraft or helicopter flying straight and level in smooth air). As a comparison, most current helicopters are not designed to operate above about 2.5gs.—*Pacific Defence Reporter, © 1980.*



Preparing for the Breakout

Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Kent, US Army

Of all the tactical missions which a unit can train to perform, breaking out of an encirclement is one of the least appealing. It lacks the exhilaration of seizing ground and destroying an enemy that is inherent in a successful attack while also denying the satisfaction to be derived from a well-conducted defense. There is even a strong connotation of failure and lack of foresight attached to the operation—what else would cause a unit to become encircled? Predictably enough, most units succumb to this line of thought and do not train for the breakout from encirclement. Unfortunately, there is a high probability in any conflict involving Warsaw Pact forces that some US Army elements will become encircled and will be faced with the possibility of either capture or destruction. For ground units committed as part of the Rapid Deployment Force in a hostile, distant environment against a numerically superior enemy, the chance of encirclement may be even greater.

CURRENT US Army doctrine on the breakout from encirclement, while basically sound, has certain aspects of sequencing and unit missions which have been tried and found wanting during training exercises. Additionally, more specifics on how to train for the breakout are needed. For these reasons, training for the breakout can no longer be slighted, and the doctrine, as well as the training techniques for this operation, should be re-examined.

In the 82d Airborne Division, breaking out from the encirclemnt has received considerable attention for the past several years, and the lessons learned from this have wider application. This article addresses the doctrine for the breakout currently contained in Field Manual (FM) 71-2, *The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, and FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger)*, and the techniques involved in training for and executing the operation.

The basic organization for the breakout consists of elements assigned the missions of the diversionary attack, rupture force, reserve and covering force. The sequence of events as stated in FMs 71-2 and 7-20 calls for a diversionary attack followed by the rupture of the encirclement and the seizing of the shoulders of the rupture gap, with the covering force providing security to the rear. Using this as a point of departure, let us examine the practical aspects of what must be done to successfully conduct a breakout from encirclement.

Developing the Situation

The problem here is to determine that you are, in fact, encircled before enemy deployments are complete and chances for a successful breakout are correspondingly reduced. Without a reasonably accurate picture of enemy units and dispositions, planning for the breakout is likely to become a "template drill" which no encircled unit can afford.

While all sources can and should be used to gain this intelligence, the real key lies in aggressive use of both ambush and

reconnaissance patrols. These provide the added benefit of keeping the enemy at a respectful distance, thus retaining maneuver room for the breakout and some freedom from the effects of the enemy's direct-fire weapons.

Since combat experience has shown that a force ratio of approximately 3-to-1 is required to encircle, in a training situation it will be rare that a battalion has an opposing force adequate to establish a full encirclement. One way to compensate for this is to post signs bearing enemy unit symbols on trees around the "encirclement" unit to supplement the actual opposing force. A comparison of the known units and locations with reports received from subunits will provide a good idea of how effective the patrolling effort has been.

The friendly situation within an encirclement (see Figure 1) is almost always confused, with fragments of various combat, combat support and possibly combat service support units present. An encirclement may consist of several pockets in close proximity but separated by the enemy, a series of mutually supporting positions, or a single perimeter of varying shape and size. As soon as it becomes apparent that there is an encirclement, the highest priority should be given to the establishment of command and control over all friendly units by the senior combat arms officer present.

To accomplish this, it may be necessary to use patrols, runners, wire, radio, helicopter couriers or any other means of communication. The commander must learn which elements are present and their current situation. He must quickly disseminate a warning order for the breakout while establishing reliable radio communications with all encircled units. It may be necessary to reallocate radios; this must be done early on.

Planning and Execution Timing

A breakout is a complex operation, and each maneuver element involved must perform a totally different mission with its action in the proper sequence and relationship to other units.

The overriding tactical principle during the breakout is the maintenance of all-around security. Additionally, as elements withdraw from the perimeter toward the breakout point, they must maintain sufficient dispersion to avoid presenting a lucrative target for enemy attack, either by maneuver units or indirect-fire weapons.

On the other hand, if extreme dispersion is maintained, there will be considerable gaps in the breakout column—a condition which invites defeat in detail. An important technique may be employed to achieve the precise timing necessary for fully coordinated, continuous movement through the breakout point: Thoroughly reconnoiter the routes and terrain between current positions and the breakout point and establish a matrix for the required sequence of actions based on the situation. The sequence in Figure 2 has been effective for a light infantry task force encircled within a 1½ to 2-kilometer perimeter on rolling, moderately wooded terrain. With changes in timing, it is applicable to other type forces on different terrain.

Sequence of Actions and Missions of Elements

The tactics of the breakout are based upon the condition that the enemy has forces positioned 360 degrees around the

Developing the Situation, Planning and Preparation



Figure 1

encircled force, with the heaviest concentrations on probable breakout points leading to friendly lines. Those with experience in "cordon" operations will recall that it is virtually impossible to encircle in strength at all points, and an enemy will likely maintain one or more reserves to deal with possible breakouts.

The mission of the diversionary attack force is to draw the enemy reserve far enough away from the actual breakpoint so that it will be unable to prevent the initial rupture of the encirclement or to stop passage of subsequent friendly elements through the breakout gap. To accomplish this and to return in time to join the breakout, it must be light, fast and heavily armed.

The diversionary attack should be aimed at a logical objective such as a bridge or pass leading to friendly lines. Machineguns and other direct-fire weapons support from the perimeter to assist the breakout force so that it does not become decisively engaged. Indirect-fire support, if available, should be used to give credibility to the attack (Figure 3).

The key decision to be made by the commander concerns the point at which he considers the enemy reserve moving to commitment and, consequently, when the diversionary attack should withdraw. Obviously, good intelligence and reporting are prerequisites for a sound decision. The commander must be wary of any suggestion to convert the diversionary attack into the main breakout if it is successful in opening a wide gap or does not appear to be opposed. This change will succeed *only* if a contingency plan for it is thoroughly prepared and understood. Excellent communications is another prerequisite for changing the operation while underway because, if just one element does not perform as planned, the entire operation will be in extreme jeopardy.

The sequence of actions as described in FM 7-20, especially with regard to the initial phases of the breakout, may not be the most effective. Experience has shown that it is most important for the rupture force to *maintain its momentum*, and, to do this, it should *not* have to fight in several directions at once. Therefore, the shoulder force (reserve) should attack, first, to seize objectives which are sufficiently deep to place them within the enemy's belt of encirclement and widely separated enough to provide some maneuver room for the rupture force.

Ideally, the shoulder force objectives should be located on defensible terrain and at a weak point of the encirclement. If *TOWs* are available, they should be given to the shoulder force to protect the flanks of the breakout against counterattack. It is apparent from this discussion of shoulder force missions that it *cannot* also be expected to function as the reserve, despite the teachings of current doctrine, since this key mission must be performed (Figure 4) until the last element has left the encirclement.

The reserve's primary function is to be prepared to assist in extricating any part of the covering force which becomes decisively engaged. This mission may be assigned to any element within the encirclement not otherwise employed. If the encircled force is a battalion task force, there is usually no requirement that the reserve consist of a company or its headquarters. A smaller unit is usually adequate.

In organizing the rupture force, remember that a combined arms team will have the most chance of success for sustaining movement during the entire operation. Tank-infantry bounding overwatch has proven to be a good form of maneuver for the initial breakout. When this succeeds, it may be appropriate to shift to traveling

Sample Sequence for Breakout

Element

	Rupture Force	Shoulder (Reserve) Force	Covering Force	Diversionary Attack	Other Elements
H-20	Moves to attack positions	At line of departure for attack	Covers diversionary attack; fills in for rupture and shoulder forces	Attacks	Defend
H-hour	At line of departure for attack	Attack to seize objectives	Covers diversionary attack; fills in for rupture and shoulder forces	Withdraws	Defend
H+10	Attacks	Defends	Covers return of diversionary attack and covers gaps left by rupture and shoulder forces	Returns to perimeter	Begins movement to breakout gap
H+25	Continues attack	Defends	Covers while slowly withdrawing	Joins other withdrawing elements and may become reserve	Pass through rupture in planned order
H+45	Continues movement	Defends	Covers	Joins other withdrawing elements and may become reserve	Pass through rupture in planned order
H+60	Moves to linkup	Covers last withdrawing elements, then joins withdrawal	Passes through rupture	In column	Continue to move

Figure 2


Diversionary Attack
FLOT
Mortar
D
Rupture force
FLOT Forward line of own troops
D Diversionary attack
Encircled force
Position occupied by covering force

Figure 3

Seize Shoulders



D → Diversionary attack

Encircled force

Position occupied by covering force

(S) Shoulder force objective

FLOT Forward line of own troops

Figure 4

overwatch (Figure 5). Antitank weapons capable of engaging the enemy at a distance equal to the range of his weapons in the terrain to be encountered during the breakout (probably *Dragons*) should be dispersed throughout the column. In addition, contingency plans to deal with enemy counterattack of the breakout column must be thoroughly understood.

The question frequently arises as to which force should be the last to leave the encirclement. The overriding consideration is to maintain constant covering fires to the rear, keeping enemy forces which may be attempting to close on withdrawing friendly elements at the greatest possible distance. This is best accomplished by having the shoulder force (reserve) take up the covering fire from its positions as the last element of the covering force begins withdrawing through the breakout gap (Figures 6 and 7).

Other Critical Decisions in the Breakout

The problem of selecting a breakout route and of deciding whether to move cross-country or by road is a crucial one because upon it hinge the questions of what to do with wounded soldiers and a large portion of the unit's equipment. One extreme is to abandon everything that cannot move cross-country and to attempt to escape and evade in small groups. The other extreme is to stay road-bound and attempt to take everything. As in every operation, mission, enemy, terrain and troops available considerations will dictate the course of action to be followed, but experience has shown the following:

- Road-bound breakouts are slow, noisy and easy for the enemy to block and counterattack. Drivers are often fatigued and fall asleep at halts, drive into ditches or otherwise cause separations in the column.
- Since it is obviously undesirable to leave the wounded to the enemy and to destroy equipment, some means should be sought to get everything out without jeopardizing the entire operation.

One possible solution is to load the seriously wounded on vehicles and to include a minor road or trail in the breakout gap. At an appropriate point, soon after the breakout, the vehicles separate from the main column and attempt to infiltrate to a linkup point using back trails. Of course, the cross-country movement capability of the unit's vehicles has a great influence on this operation, and many variations are possible. Another possible solution is to attempt a second breakout for vehicles.

Each of these possible solutions has risks and advantages. But, in every case, the walking wounded accompany the breakout force, and no equipment should be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy without being destroyed. In training, requiring each vehicle to carry a gray-painted soft-drink can to simulate a

Rupture Force Attacks



D ⟶ Diversionary attack

Position occupied by covering force

Task force trains

FLOT Forward line of own troops

Figure 5

Rupture Attack Continues, Perimeter Contracts

Restrictive fire line with linkup point

Task force trains

Position occupied by covering force

FLOT Forward line of own troops

Figure 6

Last Covering Force Element Passes Through Gap, and All Elements Begin Moving in Breakout Column (Linkup Shown, This May Occur Later)



Figure 7

thermite grenade is a good way to practice this.

There will almost always be some elements belonging to the encircled unit which are *not* encircled. The mortar platoons (both 81mm and 107mm) and the scouts are frequently in this situation and may have no idea that a breakout is about to occur. The unit's field standing operating procedure must designate a leader (either the combat support company commander or the heavy mortar platoon leader) to assume control of these elements. This individual learns the breakout plan by secure or encoded communications and organizes their efforts to support the breakout. If this is not done, these elements will probably be left on their own to encounter a superior enemy force or to blunder into other friendly forces with potentially disastrous results.

Of all military operations, the possibility that a unit will become demoralized or disorganized is greatest during the breakout. The solution to this problem lies in maintaining tight discipline and control while keeping all levels constantly informed. Personnel accountability is a particular problem; the maintenance of a strong chain of command will go a long way toward solving this and other problems inherent in the operation.

Linking up with friendly forces after the breakout is an integral part of the operation which is sometimes overlooked under the pressure to get out of the encirclement. A detailed plan for this must be made and coordinated. The most important elements of the plan include the exact point of linkup; the fire support plan, to include the restrictive fire line; radio communications with the linkup force; and the near and far recognition signals. Without these, a battle between friendly units becomes a distinct possibility.

Things That Go Wrong or "Murphy Strikes Again"

When a unit realizes that it is encircled, common sense dictates that the commander attempt to break out before the enemy's noose tightens even further and breakout becomes all but impossible. While there is much to be said for a hasty operation, if it is done before complete planning and preparation have been accomplished, it has an unacceptable risk of failure. An essential part of the troop-leading process is to develop a set of contingency plans with which the unit can react effectively if the enemy chooses not to react according to the scenario. These plans give a unit flexibility; trying to "wing it" almost always results in disaster because of the inherent complexity of the operation.

During the execution, closely coordinated movements are an absolute necessity. A traffic jam at the breakout point, for example, invites confusion and destruction. If each element does not conduct a thorough reconnaissance to the breakout point, either gaps in the column or bunched-up formations invariably result. The need for coordination between the shoulder force and the rupture force during the initial breakout is particularly acute. Without it and the personal presence of the commander, these elements can easily clash and inflict sizable casualties on each other.

Despite the great need for dispersion and all-around security, units often bunch up in order to maintain control or because the uncertainty of the situation stimulates the gregarious instinct.

Finally, units often ignore their fire support assets in their preoccupation with an elaborate tactical plan. Remem-

ber, a breakout unit needs *MASS*, both to effect the breakout and to deal with enemy counterattacks. If the unit concentrates on the ground more than it has to, it risks being encircled again. Indirect-fire support provides a good portion of the solution to this problem.

Training for the breakout is not currently considered "fun," but a realistic appraisal of potential enemy tactics and the world situation indicates that encirclements of US forces are likely to occur. When this happens, only the trained, disciplined unit will have a reasonable chance of coming out intact. The breakout is an enormous test of the ingenuity, analytical abilities and steadiness under pressure of commanders and staffs. At the most basic level, it is another battle which we must win. Let's take up the challenge!

MR

Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Kent is currently assigned to the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, USACGSC. He received a B.S. from the USMA, an M.A. from George Washington University and is a graduate of the USACGSC. He served two tours in Vietnam and two in Germany. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, he was an instructor at the Institute for Military Assistance; G3 plans officer with the XVIII Airborne Corps; and commander of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division.

New Training Magazine Starts in August. *The Army Trainer* is the name of a new quarterly magazine scheduled to begin publication next month. Produced by the US Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia, its purpose is to help train the trainer.

The new quarterly is targeted to those soldiers in grades E5 to O3 who are involved in training—from platoon sergeants through company or battery commanders—along with training developers. The magazine will provide an Armywide forum to identify, integrate and explain the use of many and varied parts of the Army Training System.

The Army Trainer solicits articles dealing with unit or collective training, experience with new training methods and devices, and feature articles about trainers. For further information, or to inquire about submitting articles, contact: Editor, *The Army Trainer*, US Army Training Support Center, ATTN: Fort Eustis, VA 23604. The telephone number is (804) 878-4587/4605 or AUTOVON 927-4587/4605.

We Need Your Comments

We are reviewing the makeup of our Reviews, Letters, News and Books sections of *Military Review*. We would like to know your views on the information we publish. Are the sections of proper length, or should certain ones be expanded or shortened? If so, which ones? Is the content appropriate? What changes would make these sections more meaningful to the reader? Please make your preferences known by placing them on the comment card found in the back of this issue and mailing it to us.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

—The Editors

MR REVIEWS

The Soviet Ground Forces

By Colonel Daniel K. Malone, USA
NATO's Fifteen Nations,
October-November 1980
(The Netherlands)

The Soviet ground forces are a trusted instrument of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a formidable force that can strike with very little warning. According to Colonel Daniel K. Malone, a former military attaché in the US Embassy in Moscow and a researcher of Soviet military scientific-technical, economic and political-military affairs, the Soviet ground forces have a very specific role to play in war. Soviet doctrine states that, although nuclear weapons will be the main means of fighting the next war, "Only the Ground Forces can bring the war to a conclusion by occupying territory and achieving the final destruction of capitalism's armed force."

The Soviet ground forces, according to the author, have evolved based on the lessons of the past. Their organization and weapons reflect their particular war experience. First, the vast Russian steppes have influenced them to develop "small, highly maneuverable, light tail-to-tooth battle divisions. Maneuver, on a grandiose scale, forms pillar and post of their ground force operations."

Second, they have an appreciation from World War II of the scale and mass of equipment needed to fight a war in Europe. This experience has led them to amass the resources needed to fight the next war, today, before the war begins. Their current inventories of war equipment attest to their belief in this lesson from the past.

The key elements of their ground forces are motorized rifle troops, tank troops, rocket and artillery troops and air defense troops. These four, welded together by engineer, communications and other special supporting troops and services, form the Soviet ground forces.

A unique aspect of their tactical doctrine is the emphasis on combined arms. Soviet military theory inserts a third category of military knowledge between the usual strategy and tactics—namely, "operational arts." This is the theory of command of larger formations of armies and *fronts* (army groups). This element of ground force operations provides the know-how to conduct combined arms war-

fare on the scale anticipated by Soviet tacticians.

The Communist Party maintains a strong hold on the army. For example, all tactical orders must first be countersigned by a party political officer before they can be carried out. Ninety percent of the officers and enlisted men of the army are party members or Komsomols—one step before party membership. This compares to only 6 percent of the Soviet population who are party members. The party also ensures that each soldier receives six hours a week of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination.

Soviet military doctrine is laid down by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, decided upon by the Politburo. Their ground forces are highly disciplined, are loyal and are a trusted instrument of the party. If war in Europe comes, these forces can be counted on to do the bidding of their leaders.—SIK.

Overarming and Underwhelming

By Barry R. Posen and
Stephen W. Van Evera
Foreign Policy, Number 40, Fall 1980

"We need to increase significantly our military budget." "Our forces are not adequate to defend our oil supply lines." Such statements were typical of the rhetoric heard during the recent presidential campaign. How much is truth, and how much is simply election-year propaganda? In the minds of Barry Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera, there is, at best, only limited validity in these statements.

Posen and Van Evera, associates at the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, assert that the current discussion of defense issues is "ridden with misinformation and flimsy analysis." Consequently, the strategy requiring increased financial expenditures remains vague. The authors note that, first, NATO outspends the Warsaw Pact by at least $20 billion, and, by one calculation, NATO spends twice as much. Given these figures, they see the answer to limiting Soviet expansion not in terms of more money, but in doctrinal change, force structure and weapons' choice.

The West's big concern today is the security of the Persian Gulf. Any Soviet threat there must be met with intervention forces. Are we drastically inferior to the Soviets in this area? The United States has 15 times as many Marines as the Soviets (184,000 to 12,000), three times the fleet carrying capacity, twice the airlift capability, approximately three times as many carriers and a great advantage in mobile forces. Moreover, the United States spends 25 percent of its military budget on intervention while the Soviets spend only 10 percent. From these and other facts, the authors conclude that the West should not be "running scared" and throwing more money into the defense budget.

There are, however, other steps to be taken to improve our defense posture. Increases are needed in fuel and ammunition stocks as well as improved equipment maintenance. In addition, the United States needs to pre-position more equipment in Europe, assign a greater percentage of troops to combat roles and cut the "frills" in weapon design.

The other NATO countries need to shape their reserves into combat-ready units, increase war reserve stocks, arm their forces more heavily, include civilian airlines in airlift operational plans, spend more money on defense (at least the same percentage of the gross national product as the United States, and assume more of the peacekeeping responsibilities.

Upon the completion of the above actions, Posen and Van Evera feel that US forces should be restructured for gulf contingencies (mechanized and positioned) and that our allies should be ready to shoulder the burden of their own defense while we are occupied in the gulf. On

the political side, we should align the gulf states diplomatically with us and, if possible, reach a regional understanding with Moscow.

Thus, the intense pessimism about our defense capabilities is not justified. In fact, Posen and Van Evera feel that the West is holding its own against the Soviets, and global political trends seem worse than they actually are. In any case, if increased spending is necessary, the US government should "undertake a major campaign to persuade its Western European Allies at least to do their share before it turns to the Congress for a larger American defense budget."—DEN.

Afghanistan—A Dissenting Appraisal

By Geoffrey Warhurst
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies,
September 1980 (Great Britain)

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is no threat to the Western World. In fact, the author suggests that this is only the Soviet Union's old policy, unaltered by experience or time. He believes this is not dissimilar from their other invasions of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968.

From the Soviet Union's standpoint, these countries are in their sphere of influence and invasion of these countries, to include Afghanistan, was purely defensive and aimed at protecting Soviet borders. Therefore, this recent invasion does not represent a new and more aggressive policy on the part of the Soviet Union.

The author further believes that the West is overreacting. The West should view this invasion as a failure of the Soviets' foreign policy toward a country they consider vital to its protection. The invasion represents the Kremlin's failure to keep its newest satellite, one which was to be used as a buffer between the Muslim Soviet republics in Central Asia and resurgent Islam, paternally friendly or at least in line with its views.

In 1978, Soviet influence and power reached its peak in Kabul with the establishment of a Moscow-leaning Marxist state. A very short time thereafter, the invasion occurred. What happened?

The Soviet regime began losing control of the tribesmen, and a reshuffling of the Kabul leadership was not enough to improve matters. Things were going from bad to worse, and Soviet advisers were being rounded up and routinely murdered by mobs. The choice for the Soviets was to lose the country altogether or, in a defensive move, to protect their influence with military might.

Now that the Soviets are in Afghanistan, what have they accomplished? Aside from helping the United States offset its recent setback in Iran; giving the Third World a view of the Soviets as the tough, single-minded and reactionary world force that it is; and inducing the Free World to pull together again, the Soviets are involved in a no-win situation in Afghanistan. This is not an enviable position.

The probable scenario for the Soviets in Afghanistan is what it has been for all invading forces in the past. No invader can win, at least not in the usual sense. This will probably be the Soviet fate as well.

But will Soviet defeat and disgrace in Afghanistan be a plus for the West? No. Defeat usually acts only as a spur and may tempt the hard-line generals and Politburo members alike into further adventurism. It even may lead into an all-out campaign against NATO as dissent at home and hostility abroad are orchestrated into a vast verbal assault on the Soviet Union toward the end of the decade. It is, therefore, correct for the West to be disturbed over the invasion of Afghanistan, not for the reasons usually expressed, but because it could prove to be a major cause of World War III.—SIK.

The Unnoticed Challenge: Soviet Maritime Strategy and the Global Choke Points

By Admiral Robert J. Hanks, USN, Retired
Special Report by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., August 1980

The Soviet Union has launched a campaign, largely unnoticed by the United States and its allies, for control over the world's major sea-lanes—focused, in particular, on the narrow passageways, or strategic "choke points," through which these lanes must often pass. According to this report prepared by Admiral Robert J. Hanks:

Moscow—now boasting the maritime power, inherent in an ocean-going, blue-water navy, along with huge merchant, fishing, and oceanographic fleets—is well on the way to acquiring that which Great Britain possessed almost a century ago: domination of every major shipping focal point on the face of the globe.

Hanks argues that the Soviet maritime offensive, aimed as it is at regulating the seaborne trade in oil and other essential raw materials, poses an especially ominous challenge to US naval planners. He concludes that "at no time in its history has the US been so dependent upon use of the world's sea lanes for its economic and, therefore, political well-being."

If proof were needed for the linkage between maritime supremacy, the control of strategic "choke points" and the economic security of industrial America, one need only look to the Persian Gulf. Here, the conflict between Iraq and Iran threatens to spill over into the restricted passageways of the gulf—particularly the narrow Strait of Hormuz—through which more than 37 percent of US oil imports must flow.

Important as the Persian Gulf is, Moscow's "choke point" strategy, argues Hanks, is a global one. From Cuba in the Caribbean, to selective strongholds on the African coastline, to the Asian littorals of the Indian and Pacific oceans, the USSR is steadily accumulating a string of naval (as well as air) facilities from which it can credibly threaten to interdict the bulk of Western shipping at vulnerable points along the sea-lanes. Nor do current trends in the US-Soviet naval balance appear to offer early redress to Moscow's geopolitical advantage in deployed naval strength.

Hanks is sharply critical of redeployment schemes, such as "swing strategy," which envisioned, in the event of war in Europe, a sizable shift in American forces —primarily naval—from the Pacific to the Atlantic theater. Although such strategies are understandable in the context of a severely understrength US Navy, Hanks contends that the only sensible answer is "to build forces—not 'swing' them."

In calling for a broad reconstitution of US maritime power, Hanks warns that:

. . . it would be the ultimate irony of history if the United States—a nation with a 300-year heritage of dependence on and experience in the use of the seas, a nation whose dependence on the seas is greater that ever today—were ultimately to be bested by an international predator whose fundamental attention has, until recent years, been centered exclusively on the land.—DEN.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more detailed accounts, readers should refer to the original articles. No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements in these items is intended or should be inferred.—Editor.

MR NEWS

UNITED STATES

HARPOON MISSILE TO BE DEPLOYED

The McDonnell Douglas *Harpoon* antiship missile is scheduled to be deployed in *A6* aircraft squadrons later this year now that it has successfully completed its test firing phase of its operational evaluation.

During tests conducted late last year, *Harpoon* missiles were launched from *A6E* medium attack aircraft, as in the photo below, under a variety of conditions, including low-level, high-speed flights. Six *Harpoon* missiles have been launched from the *A6E Intruder,* and all scored hits in previous tests.

The *Harpoon* antiship missile is already deployed with the US Navy on 93 destroyers, frigates and cruisers; 29 nuclear attack submarines; and 39 *P3* patrol aircraft. At present, the Navy has approximately 250 *A6* aircraft in inventory. Of this total, 50 *A6Es* are presently programed to be fitted with the *Harpoon*, and the balance are planned for a later date.

The addition of the *Harpoon* missile to the *A6E* arsenal will enhance the ability of the aircraft to survive in battle because it will be able to attack enemy ships from a safe range. In addition, *A6s* with *Harpoons* will be better able to defend carrier battle forces at distances beyond the reach of enemy ships equipped with antiship missiles.

The *Harpoon* missile is now in its seventh year of production, with more than 2,000 missiles ordered to date by the US Navy and 12 allied nations.

RADAR TECHNOLOGY UNDER DEVELOPMENT

A new track-while-scan quiet radar is being developed by Hughes Aircraft Company for the US Army Missile Command. The "quiet radar" is designed to resolve two military problems—the sorting and tracking of numerous aircraft during combat and the susceptibility of current air defense radars to detection and jamming.

The new system homes in on specific enemy targets while continuing to scan the horizon for additional targets, with a minimal amount of "noise" level. Quietness is accomplished by reducing the amount of energy which is emitted by the radar.

The quiet radar avoids using large bursts of power on a single frequency but uses a steady, low-power signal employing thousands of narrow beams. The tiny beams are shot out in a rapid-fire, randomly directed sequence on constantly changing frequencies. This makes the radar very difficult to detect, giving the advantage to the user. Hughes is developing the radar under a $2-million development contract and has begun to build a complete radar for field demonstrations.—*DMS Aerospace Intelligence*, © 1980.

COMBAT-READY UNITS RECEIVE *STINGER*

The Army has begun supplying soldiers with the new *Stinger* air defense guided missile system (*MR*, Jun 1980, p 84). The first combat-ready units to get the man-portable, shoulder-fired weapon are maneuver elements of the US Army in Europe. The US Marine Corps will also use the weapon.

Stinger protects ground forces against attack by low-flying, high-speed jet aircraft and helicopters. Replacing the outwardly similar *Redeye* missile system in use for several years, *Stinger* offers several distinct advances in fighting capability. It can engage faster targets at greater range, including those flying directly toward the gunner. *Stinger* has built-in electronics compatible with all NATO aircraft that aid the gunner with aircraft identification.

The missile uses a passive infrared seeker and solid fuel rocket motor. It comes from the factory sealed in a fiberglass tube which converts to a launcher by quick attachment of a reusable gripstock containing the firing circuits and identification friend or foe radar electronics. Once the missile is fired, the launch tube can be discarded. Missile, launch tube and gripstock weigh approximately 35 pounds.

The *Military Review*, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the NEWS section of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements is intended.—Editor.

FINLAND

NEW PATROL BOAT

The first of eight new fast patrol boats (FPBs) is due to join the Finnish navy's vessel inventory this month. The new 250-ton FPBs are designed to achieve maximum payload capacity while providing an extensive tactical capability in the Baltic Sea operations area. The vessels, built by Wartsila, a Finnish shipbuilding firm, are similar to the Swedish *Spica II* class fast patrol boat.

The design of this new FPB allows for a wide range of optional weapons fit. The vessels will probably be armed with antiship and antisubmarine torpedoes, as well as the standard type of light gun armament. It appears the Finnish FPBs will use the French *Exocet* surface-to-surface missile (possibly the new *MM40* (*MR*, Jun 1981, p 86) instead of the Soviet *SSN2 Styx* missile normally deployed by the Finnish navy.

The vessel will be powered by three Rolls Royce *Proteus* gas turbines which can develop 11,580 horsepower. The engines will be arranged in two independent engine rooms to allow for maximum survivability in case of damage and for a more flexible maintenance schedule.

A full range of modern navigational aids is provided, and a comprehensive communications suite will be fitted with transmitters and receivers capable of ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore and ship-to-air communications.

The FPBs will have a crew of 30 and will have sufficient stores to allow for extended sea patrols.

Navy International

URUGUAY

NAVY PURCHASES PATROL AIRCRAFT

A Beechcraft *Super King Air* maritime patrol aircraft has become the Uruguayan navy's first turbine-powered airplane. The *Super King Air* is uniquely suited for one of the Uruguayan navy's missions of patrolling its 200-mile offshore exclusive economic zone. The zone encompasses an area of 50,000 square miles of territorial waters.

The importance of this mission is that fishing is one of Uruguay's largest exports. It is up to the Uruguayan navy to ensure that there are no unauthorized intruders into their territorial fishing waters.

Equipped with a large surface-search radar system, the *Super King Air* has a 360-degree scan which provides significantly better detection capability than conventional weather radar systems. The aircraft also features tip-tanks which, along with the aircraft's standard fuel system, give it an extended endurance capability. The *Super King Air* can fly to a search area 50 nautical miles from its base at 25,000 feet and remain over the search area for 9.3 hours. On a low-altitude mission at 2,000 feet, it can remain in the search area for 6.6 hours.

Uruguay is the second nation to operate Beechcraft *Super King Air* maritime patrol aircraft. The Japanese have taken delivery of 11, with two more on order scheduled for delivery next summer.

JAPAN

OIL UNDER SAIL

The Japanese-based Aitoku Company has launched the world's first sail-equipped tanker. The 900-ton tanker is a two-masted vessel with an auxiliary diesel engine that is already in use transporting oil to ports along the Asian coast.

The tanker, called the *Shin-Aitoku Maru,* is equipped with a pair of plastic sails linked to the ship's 1,600-horsepower engine via a microcomputer. When wind velocity reaches 5 meters per second, the engine automatically disengages, the sails unfurl and the tanker proceeds on sheer wind power at a rate of 12 knots or more.

The main virtue of the sail-supplemented ship is fuel efficiency. While experts consider the estimates of a 50-percent fuel savings as overly optimistic, even the most conservative observers agree that a 10-percent cut in fuel consumption is likely.

Although this tanker is relatively small when compared to the large half-million-ton tankers now in operation, some researchers believe that, in the future, much bulkier and more versatile sail-equipped tankers will prove to be practical.—*Technology Review*, © 1981.

SWITZERLAND

SEAGUARD DEFENDS AGAINST MISSILES



Contraves AG

The Swiss consortium of Contraves AG and Machine Tool Works Oerlikon-Buehrle has developed *Seaguard*, a close-in weapons system designed to defend surface ships against antiship missiles. The system is expected to be successful day or night in a variety of weather and sea conditions and even during severe electronic countermeasures.

Seaguard is composed of three principal components: the operator console, the tracker module and the gun module. There is also a C-band search radar module, called *Dolphin*, developed in conjunction with Plessey Radar which is used for the initial search and detection of incoming missiles. The tracker module uses Q-band radar, forward-looking infrared and laser sensors. The gun itself is a four-barreled 25mm cannon which uses particularly effective high-energy armor-piercing, discarding-sabot rounds.

Seaguard is currently undergoing operational tests. During the tests, it is hoped that this system will demonstrate its effectiveness against one of the greatest dangers to surface ships—that is, very low-flying antiship missiles. —*Canadian Defence Quarterly,* © 1980.

DENMARK

ARMS PURCHASE

The Swedish recoilless antitank gun, the *Carl-Gustaf*, has recently been purchased by the Danish army at a cost of 25-million Swedish kronor. The weapon is constructed of high-grade steel and has a rifled barrel. Its high-explosive antitank (HEAT) shell can destroy a tank up to 500 meters. It can also fire high-explosive, smoke and illuminating rounds. It is served by a two-man crew and can be fired unsupported

or from a flexible bipod. The photo depicts the weapon on a tripod with the *FFV551* HEAT round.—*Soldat und Technik,* © 1980.

TAIWAN

TARGET MISSILES PURCHASED

Taiwan has awarded Beech Aircraft Corporation an $11.9-million contract for production of *MQM-107A* aerial missile targets to be used for training of their defense forces. The contract includes ground support equipment and spare parts. Deliveries are scheduled to begin in February 1982.

The targets for Taiwan will be of the latest version, equipped with a *TRI60-2* engine manufactured by Microturbo Corporation of France. With increased thrust of the *TRI60-2* turbojet engines, the targets have a high speed of 616 miles per hour (535 knots). Launched from the ground, the targets are maneuverable to altitudes in excess of 40,000 feet.

The 16.8-foot long, 1,075-pound swept-wing targets are recoverable after completion of missions by means of a two-stage parachute system.

In 1977, Taiwan purchased an initial quantity of *MQM107A* target systems from Beech, followed by additional purchases in 1978 and 1979. Beech has delivered more than 400 of the *MQM107A* targets to the US Army in *Streaker* versions and to other nations.

SAUDI ARABIA

MISSILES RECEIVED

Saudi Arabia will receive 200 *AS15 TT* all-weather air-to-surface missiles as armament for antiship helicopters as part of an arms purchase from Aérospatiale of France. The *AS15 TT* is intended for attacking surface vessels of any tonnage from slow-flying aircraft or coastal batteries.

With its powerful warhead identical to that of the *AS12*, its all-weather capability, its range in excess of 15 kilometers and its extremely accurate automatic guidance system, the *AS15 TT* is a highly lethal weapon.

The operation of the *AS15 TT* is quite simple. Once a target has been identified, the radar system employed with it (*Agrion 15* surface surveillance radar) begins to track the target until the missile is launched. Once launched, the *AS15 TT's* own guidance system takes over. After a shallow dive from an aircraft, the missile follows a wave-skimming trajectory to the target.

The probability of a hit is close to 100 percent, even at maximum range, according to the manufacturer.—*Aérospatiale.*

Terrorism's Toll. Terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon. From January 1968 to October 1980, there have been more than 7,300 international terrorist incidents. Of these, 2,700 were directed at US citizens or installations. During the same period, 173 Americans were killed and 970 wounded. The annual cost of international terrorism to governments and corporations is estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Underlying these statistics are the fear and suffering that terrorism causes throughout the world and the extensive disruption of business and diplomatic activities.

MR LETTERS

Third Opinion Needed

My congratulations to *Military Review* for publishing in a single issue (January 1981) two articles that strike to the heart of the Army's current strategic posture:

- Colonel Daniel Gans' article "'Fight Outnumbered and Win'. . . Against What Odds?: Part II," graphically demonstrates the enormous disparities in main battle strength (measured by tanks deployed) which will face NATO forces in Central Army Group, Central Europe, and the dramatic effect on strength ratios that accompanies the arrival or delay of the Soviet Union's category 2 divisions.
- "US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond," by Colonel Wayne A. Downing, points out the need to structure our national military doctrine in a manner which takes account of the increasing technical sophistication and centralized execution of the Soviet military's ground elements.

Unfortunately, neither article bites the bullet to propose a coherent new operational concept. Colonel Downing's recommendation for a war of maneuver makes sense in these days of full-time satellite surveillance and multiple advance-sensor deployment only if it is interpreted as calling for maneuver of combat power, not of battalions and brigades. Movement of a mobile reserve in the classical sense of tank-infantry-artillery combinations under these conditions will surely lead to the classical results experienced by the German panzer reserve in France during the week following D-day—devastation during movement and delayed arrival at the crucial point.

Sooner or later, probably later, the Army's leadership will accept the need for fundamental re-examination of its own structure and of our combat doctrines. Colonel Gans' call for more powerful "combat multipliers" is not likely to succeed in a bureaucracy where administrative skills and command of the prevailing jargon are weighted more heavily in choosing the Army's organization and leaders than are demonstrated troop leadership and combat success.

That a fundamentally revised strategic and operational doctrine is urgently necessary cannot be denied. But that doctrine must be based on a sense of the objective, not on longstanding arms classifications or the fact that we have a large inventory of largely obsolete weapons systems. I look forward to a third article that will propose a solution.

Maj Ronald Scott Taylor, *USA, Camp Parks, California*

One and the Same

Colonel Wayne A. Downing's article, "US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond" (*Military Review*, January 1981), is another well-written article in a long series of attacks on the tactical doctrine in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*. However, as I read it, I found that the explanation of what the author thought should be done left little room for disagreement. In fact, with a couple of exceptions, the author's concept is inherent in the concepts and doctrine

as currently published.

There have been a few problems with the keystone manual FM 100-5 and its associated manuals. These problems, however, were not as much with the doctrine as with the perceptions of what people thought was meant. Unfortunately, some of our very capable leaders at most echelons of the Army do not have a good understanding of the doctrine they contain. I think this article's criticism of our current doctrine largely results from such a misunderstanding.

The article says:

The manual is pure, traditional US Army firepower-attrition doctrine . . . — it advocates meeting the strength of the Soviet attack (armor) head-on and destroying it by massed firepower.

On the contrary, FM 100-5 is written around the premise that, locally, we will be grossly outnumbered and thus cannot meet the attack head-on with massed firepower. Mobility is the key to the active defense. Attacks on the attacker from positions and movement to other advantageous positions at the proper time is the essence of the doctrine. It is a firepower-attrition doctrine from the viewpoint that we are not initially keyed to holding terrain, but it is not a firepower-attrition doctrine of the type purported in the article.

The objective of a defense is to make the attacker wish he had left well enough alone, to cease his aggressive actions and to make him return home. The best way to do that is to make it too expensive in terms of manpower and equipment losses to continue with his aggressive behavior. That, to me, means killing the enemy in sufficient numbers as early in the battle as possible. But, as the author points out, we cannot do that, while at a 6-to-1 numerical disadvantage, by massing our firepower to stand and fight. We must be mobile, take maximum advantage of the terrain and capitalize on where the enemy is weakest. In other words, be smart about how we fight. You do that through a combination of effective mobility and firepower. You do that by understanding and employing the tactics of our "How to Fight" manuals.

I applaud the statement at the end of the article that says, "The US Army must embrace a doctrine it knows can win! This confidence must permeate the ranks from general to private."

The Army thinks it has such a doctrine. The author has, in fact, preached many of its properties in his "solution." There are few things, however, in his proposal that contradict the Army's current doctrinal thinking.

The problem with this article is that it is yet another in a long series of attacks on the doctrine "embraced" by the Army which tends to degrade the "confidence" of "the ranks from general to private." The sad thing is it is largely based on a misunderstanding of what the current doctrinal thinking of the Army actually is today.

Lt Col L. M. Pique, *USA, London, England*

More on "Fighting Outnumbered . . . "

Colonel Daniel Gans' article, " 'Fight Outnumbered and Win'. . . Against What Odds?: Part II," presented an excellent analysis of the various factors that could affect the outcome of the potential battle in Europe. I do, however, question his conclusions about the necessity of mechanizing the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions.

At D+22, Colonel Gans places Soviet troops across the Rhine River between Duisburg and Wesel. An examination of the terrain shows that this area is heavily urbanized. In fact, the main autobahn approaches to the Duisburg River crossing

site traverse some 60 kilometers of urban area, starting near Dortmund.

According to Paul Bracken's article, "Urban Sprawl and NATO Defense" (*Military Review*, October 1977), the expansion of the urbanized terrain in that area will, sometime in the 1980s, "form a single gigantic urban barrier 300 kilometers long, stretching down the Rhine from Bonn to the Hook of Holland." Thus, we should assume that military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) will be the principal activity being conducted in that sector starting at about D+18 if we accept Colonel Gans' expected rate of advance of 17 to 22 kilometers per day.

Now, if the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions were also to become POMCUS (prepositioning of material configured to unit sets) divisions slated to arrive at about D+15, they would be able to be effective in the defense of the Rhine River conurbation, thus increasing the chances of holding the Rhine. Assuming that these divisions were to be given this mission, there would be two important considerations that justify them remaining as substantially nonmechanized. First, consider a cost factor: pre-positioning equipment for a light infantry division should be cheaper than for a mechanized division.

The second consideration is tactical. According to Field Manual 90-10, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain:*

Mounted forces are restricted to streets, alleys and open areas between buildings. Dismounted forces maximize available cover by moving through buildings and underground systems, along edges of streets and over roofs.

Thus, if only a European support mission were examined, it would seem that it would be beneficial to have the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions remain nonmechanized. Furthermore, it would seem that the Rapid Deployment Force concept should be afforded the flexibility to be able to call on a regular light infantry division for MOUT throughout the rest of the world.

SSgt Patrick J. Coyle, *USA, Berlin, Germany*

Cadet Requests Subscription

As a cadet at the Army Reserve Officer's Training Corps unit at Georgia State University, I wish to commend the members of your organization for their outstanding publication. An open forum for the discussion of ideas, both old and new, is vital if we are to remain capable of carrying out our responsibilities to ourselves and the world. The *Military Review* serves in this role. You will find a check enclosed to cover the cost of a one-year subscription. Please enter my name among those individuals who receive your publication.

Cadet Robert E. Gordon, *Atlanta, Georgia*

Letters is a feature designed expressly to afford our readers an opportunity to air their opinions and ideas on military topics. It is not restricted to comments or rebuttals on previously published material but is open to any variety of expression which may stimulate or improve the value of thought in the military community.

The right to edit is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily in deference to available space.—Editor.

MR BOOKS

CERTAIN VICTORY: How Hanoi Won the War by Denis Warner. 295 Pages. Sheed, Andrews & McMeel Inc., Mission, Kan. 1978. $9.95.

Six years ago on 30 April, a tank from the II Corps, North Vietnamese Army (NVA), rolled down a deserted Saigon street and smashed through the iron gates of the Independence Palace—marking the end of the second Indochina war. Since that time, or even since the 1973 Paris Agreement, most Americans have blotted out both memories and careful consideration of that divisive war and its aftermath.

In a sense, subsequent events in Asia have served to silence both supporters and critics of the US experience in Vietnam. The continuing Vietnamese Communist conquest of Southeast Asia must appear to all but the most doctrinaire "dove" to resemble the domino theory debated so long ago. By the same token, "hawks" continue to be silenced by events that bear witness to the military and foreign policy paralysis inflicted by lack of success in that war.

As an Australian journalist and war correspondent, Denis Warner's account contains many professional insights. The disastrous withdrawal from the Central Highlands following the loss of Banmethuot is described as a necessary shortening of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) supply lines. This retreat that became a rout was doomed by hasty planning, the need to withdraw soldiers' families (and most of the civilian population) and the surprising mobility of the NVA forces. The book outlines the NVA battle plan that conquered South Vietnam in a lightning 51-day campaign and the plan's gifted architect, senior General Van Tien Dung. The story of General Dung's rise from textile worker to 36-year-old chief of staff for General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1953 to audacious commander in 1975 is masterful.

Drawing heavily on General Dung's own writings, the author vividly details the aggressive pursuit, its responsive support from the Hanoi leadership and the *dich van* (psychological warfare) campaign in the United States. It is a classic case study worthy of a military school's curriculum. These strategic moves are no less spectacular than the 1,000-mile forced march by the NVA I Corps to participate in the battle for Saigon or the NVA tank-artillery attack on Phan Rang that captured the defending ARVN commanding general and his deputy air force commander. Food for thought is in abundance.

Two minor defects of the book spring from its strengths. As an Australian, Warner exaggerates Australian influence upon events—although it is instructive to learn of the early 1960's Australian interest in luring the United States into a defense commitment to the "land-bridge of Southeast Asia." By the same token, Warner's Australian perspective has a detachment that few Americans can effectively muster. Also, a book published so soon after such cataclysmic events often loses the historical context so necessary for a balanced view. Here again, however, the defect is questionable; Warner's "personal account of . . . Hanoi's ultimate victory" requires freshness. History, someone said, has a way of making everything inevitable.

Certain Victory's enduring contribution, however, is to chronicle the final tragedy of the second Indochina war and to signify the beginning of the third.

Tragedy abounds—from the South Vietnamese officials abandoned to the inability of the United States to influence events as, quoting General Dung, "The U.S. Ambassador had to crawl onto the roof of the Embassy building to escape." This, of course, was the ultimate American tragedy—as the US executive branch, paralyzed by Watergate, watched an irresponsible Congress remove whatever chance there was of Vietnamization succeeding.

As the book's subtitle indicates, however, the Politburo in Hanoi had much to do with achieving certain victory. As their military machine continues the conquest and the insurgency in Thailand intensifies, these events must be remembered. As in the quote from Douglas Pike, "The most important thing about Vietnam is to understand it."

Lt Col Franklin Y. Hartline, *USA*,
Military Faculty, Industrial College of the Armed Forces

THE NEW RED LEGIONS: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier by Richard A. Gabriel. 246 Pages. **THE NEW RED LEGIONS: A Survey Data Source Book** by Richard A. Gabriel. 252 Pages. Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. 1980. $49.95 a set.

Cohesion in military organizations, particularly at the small-unit level, is vital. Call it what you will—esprit, morale, spirit—it is that intangible ingredient that can spell the difference between victory and defeat under the most stressful condition possible: the clash of arms on a battlefield.

Our Army has become particularly sensitive to cohesion. Special study groups, a possible return to a regimental system, new peacetime awards, distinctive insignia and wearing apparel for special units all represent this heightened interest.

According to Richard A. Gabriel, professor of politics at St. Anselm's College in Manchester, New Hampshire, the Soviet military leadership has much to learn of cohesion. An indefatigable researcher into military cohesion, Gabriel co-authored the 1978 *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*, a highly critical account of the US Army in Vietnam and its problems of cohesion.

With *The New Red Legions*, Gabriel plows new ground into our understanding of the Soviet soldier, his feelings about unit, leaders and buddies. I would like to believe it all because Gabriel portrays the Soviet soldier as one who has no strong personal ties to his comrades, no strong unit ties and no strong leadership elements in the units. Instead, the author's research portrays the picture of an organization racked by internal stresses that could cripple any offensive combat effort. Perhaps the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will bear out this contention.

At any rate, *The New Red Legions* should erase once and for all the "10-foot-tall" myth of the Soviet soldier. He is anything but. Surveying over 100 Soviet army veterans, recent émigrés to Canada, Italy and the United States (questionnaire, data and tables are contained in the source book companion), Gabriel's portrait of the Soviet soldier and his unit is devastating.

Bound by ideological conviction in the Soviet doctrine of cohesion and confident that they would perform well in combat, certainly when defending "Mother Russia," Gabriel concludes that the Soviet soldier sees no point to his military service and has failed to integrate himself fully into his military unit through the development of strong primary groups. Within his unit, he is a stranger among strangers. What we know of the history of military units that came to battle as associations of strangers instead of as a band of brothers is that they tend to fight badly, are unreliable and break apart under stress. These same characteristics are potentially present in the Soviet

soldier, and, under the right circumstances, they can be expected to make themselves felt in the fighting ability of the Soviet army.

Despite some reservations about the analysis (small sample size, length of questionnaire, demography of respondents), I believe that *The New Red Legions* is indeed valuable. It sharpens our focus on a potential adversary and furthers our knowledge of factors of military cohesion. On those two counts alone, these volumes should find their way into service school libraries and, more important, curricula.

Col John G. Fowler Jr., *USA*,
Combined Arms Training Developments Activity

WHEN GOVERNMENTS COLLIDE: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968 by Wallace J. Thies. 446 Pages. University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 1980. $20.00.

This book is for the serious student of American military and diplomatic history as it relates to the Vietnam War in particular and "coercive" or limited war in general. Essentially, Professor Thies, a political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, has provided a rather detailed history of the Johnson administration's attempt to coerce the North Vietnamese into stopping their aggression against South Vietnam. The period covered is from January 1964, when actions against North Vietnam were decided upon, until May 1968 with the start of the Paris talks.

Drawing from the *Pentagon Papers* and many other documents and pronouncements, the author has constructed an excellent historical analysis. It deals with what happened both from the United States' perspective and that of North Vietnam during the critical four-year period that the policy of "gradualism" or, as the author calls it, "coercive warfare," was being applied by the United States. Thies also, as a consequence of this study, offers several concerns, lessons, and so forth that should be given serious consideration before engaging in coercive warfare in the future.

The author is critical of the Johnson administration's policy and the way the policy was implemented. He points out that, among other things, several of the basic assumptions made by the Washington policymakers were invalid. Other criticisms have to do with the bad timing of actions, differences between what the policymaker intended and what the implementors actually did, and failure to view the North Vietnamese leadership correctly.

This book is not for the casual reader. It is, however, an extremely well-written, scholarly examination of a major event in our nation's military and political history. The lessons noted should be taken to heart and carefully studied for future application in limited war situations.

Lt Col John A. Hardaway, *USA*,
Department of Academic Operations, USACGSC

THE RAIDERS: The Elite Strike Forces That Altered the Course of War and History by Richard Garrett. 224 Pages. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., N.Y. 1980. $18.95.

This is an interesting 219-page book that describes a number of small-unit combat operations throughout history, some well-known and some rather obscure. The author's purpose was "to write a history of raiders, and to illustrate it by a dozen such operations." He begins with a short prologue that discusses irregular or unconventional operations (author's terms) from the 15th century B.C. to the early 19th century. From there, he discusses 12 operations, concluding with the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976. The various operations discussed come from a number of countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel and the United States) and give the reader an

opportunity to see how each of these countries approaches this aspect of warfare.

The author's style of writing is excellent, and his book is easy to read. The book also has a number of pictures and sketches that help set the stage for each particular operation.

One element of warfare affected most of the operations discussed—weather. Its effect on operations is well-described in most cases. Where weather was not taken into account during the planning phase, the operation ended in failure. This is an all-too-sad and often-repeated situation where professional soldiers have failed to heed the lessons of history.

This book, however, has a couple of flaws which reduce its usefulness. First, the reader is misled by its subtitle. Few of the operations discussed really "altered the course of war and history." In fact, at the conclusion of one operation (the US Marine Corps raid on Makin Island in 1942), the author states:

Whether the raid on Makin Island achieved its purpose may be doubtful. Did it really divert the Japanese from sending supplies and reinforcements to Guadalcanal? It seems unlikely.

It would have been better if the author had been satisfied to just write a general history of this type of operation and not tried to inflate the importance of them. And, second, the book does not contain any maps. It is very difficult to understand clearly the narrative of most of the discussed operations because of this failure. One or two maps for each chapter would have made a difference to the reader.

For the serious student of warfare, the complete history of irregular operations and their impact on history has yet to be written. For the general reader, however, this book provides a broad background of information.

Col Earl E. Perry, *USA*,
Senior Army Adviser, Arkansas National Guard

THE NAVAL AIR WAR, 1939-1945 by Nathan Miller. 223 Pages. Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, Annapolis, Md. 1980.

Of the tactical developments wrought by World War II, the expansion in the role of naval aviation stands among the most significant. *The Naval Air War: 1939-1945* contains a treatment of the revolution in naval aviation which is both concise and enjoyable.

The author divides wartime naval air operations into three overlapping phases. At the beginning of the war, the battleship was still perceived to be the supreme component of sea power. The carrier and its aircraft were to protect the fleet from air attack and to perform reconnaissance. Naval aviation's offensive role was seen to be merely an extension of surface firepower.

An excellent illustration of this concept of naval aviation in action was the pursuit and destruction of the German battleship *Bismarck* in the Atlantic in May 1941. The *Bismarck* was disabled by British torpedo planes from the carrier *Ark Royal* which allowed British surface ships to close with and destroy it.

The secondary role of the carrier ended spectacularly with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although the success of the attack directly demonstrated the potency of carrier-based sea power, the author notes that there was an even more important indirect effect. The US Navy was deprived of its battleships. Only a pitifully few carriers remained upon which to base counterstrokes. The carriers became the backbone of fleet operations. This phase of naval aviation's development was exemplified by the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway and other actions during the period between Pearl Harbor and mid-1944.

The third phase of the naval air war began with the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. From this point, the Fast Carrier Task Force ruled the Pacific. In the author's words:

Not only had the Fast Carrier Task

Force superseded the battleship, but it had become the instrument through which the U.S. Navy projected its power over land and sea alike.

In *The Naval Air War: 1939-1945*, Nathan Miller does much more than simply trace the worldwide highlights of the rapid development of naval aviation during the war years. At each stage, he provides detailed examples which graphically illuminate the drama of the air war at sea. In addition, a superb selection of more than 150 photographs supplements the text. This book is a highly readable presentation of a critical element of recent military history. The book is highly recommended to both those with a specific interest in naval history and to the general reader.

Maj David L. Watkins, *USA*,
Counterintelligence Department,
Fifth US Army Area Intelligence School

PUERTO RICO'S FIGHTING 65TH U.S. INFANTRY: From San Juan to Chorwan by Brigadier General W. W. Harris, US Army, Retired. 220 Pages. Presidio Press, San Rafael, Calif. 1980. $12.95.

As the commander of the Regular Army's only all-Puerto Rican combat unit during its first nine months of Korean combat in 1950-51, General W. W. Harris offers an excellent firsthand account of the US 65th Infantry Regiment "*Borinqueneers*" at war. A hitherto unwritten chapter in the US Army's participation in the Korean War, the book is equally a solid study in command that bears valuable lessons for today. Although personal modesty evidently prevented General Harris from taking credit for the unit's wartime achievements, more objective observers might readily perceive the author's leadership role throughout this account.

General Harris initially covers the period from his assumption of command in 1949 to the regiment's deployment to Korea in late August 1950 as a last-minute roundout for the understrength 3d Infantry Division. This coverage may be as worthwhile for current miltary professionals as his description of the difficult combat situations the regiment encountered after its arrival. Harris had been forewarned about the low-priority status of the 65th Infantry which had suffered from five decades of official "benign neglect" and the more immediate austerity of the post-World War II US military posture. Instead, then-Colonel Harris discovered a solid cadre of experienced officers and noncommissioned officers and a regiment that maintained a fierce pride in soldiering.

Lacking a third infantry battalion, most of its heavy weapons and with generally inadequate training facilities, Harris initiated an intensive training program that brought the still-incomplete regiment to a high level of proficiency prior to its combat deployment. After receiving a battalion of the Panama-based 33d Infantry and its full equipment complement just before embarkation, the author recalls particularly having trained his regimental 4.2-inch mortar company while already aboard ship.

As the first 3d Infantry Division element to enter combat in Korea, its initial month-long employment as a counter-guerrilla force marked the first time the unit had fought as a full regiment since its activation in March 1899. Finally joining its parent division in North Korea just before the massive Chinese Communist intervention in November 1950, the 65th Regimental Combat Team played a major role in the 3d Division's covering force operations for the United Nations' withdrawal by sea from the port of Hungnam in late December 1950.

Returning to the south, it saw further intensive combat in defeating the huge Chinese offensive below Seoul and then in the series of Eighth Army counteroffensives that pushed above the 38th parallel

to the "iron triangle" area by June 1951.

More than an overview of combat operations or personal reminiscences, this book furnishes abundant examples of individual and small-unit heroism and aggressive initiative while "fighting outnumbered and winning" amidst difficult combat conditions. For this reason, as well as its warm portrayal of the Puerto Rican soldiers' splendid professional pride throughout, it makes excellent reading for US combat leaders of today.

Joseph E. Thach,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

TITO: The Story From Inside by Milovan Djilas. 185 Pages. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, N.Y. 1980. $9.95.

This is the latest, if not the last, in a series of books about Tito, Titoism and Yugoslavia which Milovan Djilas has produced in the decades since World War II. Showing evidence of having been rushed into print to take timely advantage of the market following Tito's death in 1980, it is more an "intimate biographical memoir" than a true biography. Typically, Djilas begins—and ends—his book with an ideological and personal attack on Tito, Tito's ability and the state that Tito created. Throughout, there are flashbacks and references to 1953 when Djilas was denounced and deposed from the Yugoslav leadership by Tito. The result is an almost incoherent collection of seemingly unrelated events.

For Western readers, the most valuable part of the book is its insights into the character and personal life of Tito from one—Djilas—who seems to continue his lovehate relationship with Tito beyond the grave. Although incidental, but very important in understanding the course of Yugoslav history since World War II, Djilas provides great insight into his own character and the attitudes of a certain wing of the Yugoslav leadership, past and present. Djilas comes across as pure ideologist, a theoretician who was unhappy with his agitprop role, an impractical utopian idealist (Communist utopia—worker's paradise—and all that) possessed with a holier-than-thou attitude toward human weakness and fondness for comfort, especially if the object of his outrage were Josip Broz Tito.

Djilas argues that Tito was a vacillating, indecisive, confused military commander in moments of crisis, overly concerned with his own safety. Yet, in the same passage discussing the same operation (the fourth offensive of 1943), he describes how:

. . . at the same time, dangerously, courageously, selflessly, [Tito] carried out a regrouping of troops that insured the rescue of the wounded and defeated the Germans. Tito's personal role as commander in these clashes was insignificant, perhaps negligible. But it was he who imposed a sense of danger, who established a momentum, who forced the tide to turn.

Somehow Djilas imparts a sense of disappointment, even disillusionment, that Tito did not constantly prove his courage by leading a squad or platoon in headlong attack. What more could one ask of his supreme commander than that he establish momentum and cause the tide to turn?

But these are only preliminaries, literary artifices to demonstrate that Tito had feet of clay from his earliest days. Djilas' real criticism is that Tito turned out to be just another dictator—albeit a Communist one (presumably, therefore, better than a capitalist one along the lines of the stereotyped Latin-American ruler with whom Djilas compares Tito largely because of his "autocratic" and "monarchic" practices and luxurious life style).

Djilas obviously respects Tito, the practical politician who could obtain power, preserve it and use it. But it is those uses of power that do not conform to Djilas' own special vision of what a Communist Yugoslavia should be that are the crux of the problem between the

two. Never mind that Tito led the Yugoslavs through the break with the Soviet Union and then into the leadership of the nonaligned nations. No matter that Tito made workable the hodgepodge of nationalities, religions and passions that is modern Yugoslavia.

This is an intriguing book, most interesting when it details Tito's personal habits. Unfortunately, it will remain of more lasting value for the occasional biographer of Tito and scholar of Yugoslav history rather than for the general reader.

Lt Col Scott Dillard, *USA, Department of History, USMA*

THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change by Lester C. Thurow 230 Pages. Basic Books, N.Y. 1980. $12.95.

One of the most potent issues in this year's presidential campaign was the economy's lackluster performance. In contrast to the politician's utopian promise of prompt relief from unemployment, inflation, energy shortfalls and lack of productivity, economist Lester C. Thurow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology issues some ringing challenges in a lucid, forthright and provocative economic analysis in this delightful book, *The Zero-Sum Society*. Here, he has done to the macroeconomic policymakers what Burton Malkiel did to the orthodox Wall Street analyst in his *Random Walk Down Wall Street!*

Thurow's solutions, implicit in the title, parallel game theory—if you win, then someone else must lose. US economic problems can be solved, but not without some segment of society being hurt. His principal target is the federal government because it tries to provide, simultaneously, economic security for everyone, as well as economic growth. Thurow argues the present stagnant economy is attributable to government's failure to resist growing demands for a guaranteed, secure, economic place in society.

Thurow also takes the public sector to task for failure to underwrite new technology "winners," such as agriculture and computer chip technology, rather than supporting "losers," like Chrysler. His scheme also advocates generous government funds for protecting workers by retraining them into more productive enterprises, as do the Japanese. This would correct the current tendency of US corporate managers to be overly concerned with near-term profits rather than longer term, more economically productive investment decisions. Proposals like these and others, such as creating a national investment committee to select and underwrite our economic winners, are fresh, challenging and stimulating.

This slim book, with its energetic proposals, will be at the center of economic debate for sometime. During a period of intense public debate over relative priorities to be accorded expenditure of individual tax dollars, it is refreshing to read a bold, direct, entertaining and thought-provoking analysis which challenges all of us to face up to the tough economic decisions required in charting public policy for the 1980s. If you find time for only one analysis of the current woeful economic situation, this one is well worth the effort.

Col Joel E. L. Roberts, *USA,*
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,
Headquarters, US Army, Europe, Heidelberg, GE

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

THE WAR BETWEEN THE GENERALS: Inside the Allied Command by David Irving. 446 Pages. St. Martin's Press. N Y 1981. $17.95.

FRITZ: The World War I Memoirs of a German Lieutenant by Fritz Nagel Edited by Richard A Baumgartner 116 Pages. Der Angriff Publications, Huntington, W.Va. 1981 $6.95.

WAR IN THE OUTPOSTS by Simon Rigge and the Editors of Time-Life Books. 208 Pages. Time-Life Books, Alexandria, Va. 1980. $12.95.

WEAPONS: An International Encyclopedia From 5000 B.C. to 2000 A.D. by the Diagram Group. 320 Pages. St. Martin's Press, N.Y. 1980. $25.00.

THE WORLD ALMANAC BOOK OF WHO. 360 Pages. Newspaper Enterprises Association, N.Y. 1980. $5.95.

THE U.S.S.R. IN WORLD WAR II: An Annotated Bibliography of Books Published in the Soviet Union, 1945-1975 by Michael Parrish. Introduction by John Erickson. 907 Pages. Garland Publishing, N.Y. 1981. $110.00.

WILLIAM ORLANDO DARBY: A Military Biography by Michael J. King. 219 Pages. Archon Books, Hamden, Conn. 1981. $19.50.

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK OF WORLD WAR I. Edited by Christine Bent. 310 Pages. Arno Press, N.Y. 1980. $12.98.

ONE OF CLEBURNE'S COMMAND: The Civil War Reminiscences and Diary of Captain Samuel T. Foster, Granbury's Texas Brigade, CSA. Edited by Norman D. Brown. 192 Pages. University of Texas, Austin, Texas. 1980. $14.95.

THE LAST HEROES: The Story of Three Victoria Cross Winners and Their World War II Exploits by John F. Elder. 278 Pages. Vantage Press, N.Y. 1980. $9.95.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military. Edited by Sam C. Sarkesian. 305 Pages. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif. 1980. $20.00 clothbound. $9.95 paperbound.

FORECASTING IN MILITARY AFFAIRS: A Soviet View by Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov. 230 Pages. US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1980.

IF YOU TAKE MY SHEEP: The Evolution and Conflicts of Navajo Pastoralism, 1630-1868 by Lynn R. Bailey. 300 Pages. Westernlore Press, Pasadena, Calif. 1980. $12.00.

GAVIN: A Biography of General James M. Gavin by Bradley Biggs. 182 Pages. Shoe String Press, Hamden, Conn. 1980. $17.50.

CUSTER AND THE GREAT CONTROVERSY: Origin and Development of a Legend by Robert M. Utley. 184 Pages. Westernlore Press, Pasadena, Calif. 1980. $8.50.

POLITICS AND FORCE LEVELS: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration by Desmond Ball. 322 Pages. University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 1980. $27.50.

THE INTERNATIONAL WHO'S WHO, 1980-81. 1,409 Pages. Europa Publications Ltd., London, Eng. 1980. $90.00.

"WAR" AND THE MILITARY COURTS: Judicial Interpretation of Its Meaning by Dorothy Schaffter. 184 Pages. Exposition Press, Smithtown, N.Y. 1981. $20.00.

THIRTY YEARS' WAR by Herbert Langer. 280 Pages. Hippocrene Books, N.Y. 1980. $35.00.

THE B24 LIBERATOR, 1939-1945 by Martin Bowman. 128 Pages. Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Ill. 1979. $14.95.

THE FINAL FORTRESS: The Campaign for Vicksburg, 1862-1863 by Samuel Carter III. 354 Pages. St. Martin's Press, N.Y. 1980. $19.95.

RICHMOND REDEEMED: The Siege at Petersburg by Richard Sommers. 670 Pages. Doubleday & Co., N.Y. 1981. $22.50.

GRANT: A Biography by William S. McFeely. 592 Pages. W. W. Norton & Co., N.Y. 1981. $19.95.

OUR ENEMIES THE FRENCH: Being an Account of the War Fought Between the French and British, Syria, 1941 by Anthony Mockler. Archon Books, Hamden, Conn. 1976. $18.00.

BENEATH THE EAGLE'S WINGS: Americans in Occupied Japan by John Curtis Perry. 253 Pages. Dodd, Mead & Co., N.Y. 1980. $12.95.

I SAW TOKYO BURNING: An Eyewitness Narrative From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima by Robert Guillain. Translated by William Byron. 298 Pages. Doubleday & Co., N.Y. 1981. $12.95.

ROMMEL'S WAR IN AFRICA by Wolf Heckmann. Translated by Stephen Seago. Foreword by General Sir John Hackett. 366 Pages. Doubleday & Co., N.Y. 1981. $14.95.

THE SOVIET JUGGERNAUT by Earl F. Ziemke and the Editors of Time-Life Books. 208 Pages. Time-Life Books, Alexandria, Va. 1980. $12.95.

SEED OF MIDEAST CRISIS: The United States Diplomatic Role in the Middle East During World War II by Thomas A. Bryson. 216 Pages. McFarland & Co., Jefferson, N.C. 1981. $15.95.

VIETNAM: The View From Moscow, Peking, Washington by Daniel S. Papp. 257 Pages. McFarland & Co., Jefferson, N.C. 1981. $17.95.

BREZHNEV: Soviet Politician by Paul J. Murphy. 363 Pages. McFarland & Co., Jefferson, N.C. 1981. $24.95.

THE FRACTURED CONTINENT: Latin America in Close-Up by Willard L. Beaulac. 232 Pages. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Calif. 1980. $11.95.

THE NATION AT WAR by Arthur A. Stein. 151 Pages. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md. 1980. $12.95.

SHAMAN'S DAUGHTER by Nan Salerno and Rosamond M. Vanderburgh. 542 Pages. Dell Publishing Co., N.Y. 1980. $3.25.

CODE NAME NIMROD by James Leasor. 264 Pages. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, Mass. 1980. $10.95.

MUDDY GLORY: America's 'Indian Wars' in the Philippines, 1899-1935 by Russell Roth. 281 Pages. Christopher Publishing House, West Hanover, Mass. 1981. $12.95.

AERO ARMOR SERIES: Volume 11, Volume 12, Volume 13 by Uwe Feist. 51 Pages per volume. Aero Publishers, Fallbrook, Calif. Volume 11: 1979; Volume 12: 1980; Volume 13: 1980. $3.95 per volume.

THE FUTURE UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN. Edited by Wayne Valis. Introduction by Aram Bakshian Jr. 194 Pages. Arlington House, Westport, Conn. 1981. $12.95.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE by Douglas Kinnard. 252 Pages. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. 1980. $19.50.

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by William R. Cline and Sidney Weintraub. 517 Pages. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1981. $26.95 clothbound. $11.95 paperbound.

VICTORY WITHOUT WAR by Charles McGinn. 149 Pages. Hwong Publishing Co., Los Alamitos, Calif. 1980.

THE THREE PER CENT SOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF NATO by the staff of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. 118 Pages. Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelpia, Pa. 1981. $6.95.

PAYING THE MODERN MILITARY by Martin Binkin and Irene Kyriakopoulos. 83 Pages. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 1981. $3.95.

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The New Colossus

Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
"Keep ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"

— Emma Lazarus

Articles to Watch For:

Mobilization Manpower: A Credible Force or an Empty Promise?
John Turley

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Military Implications of the *Global 2000 Report*
Lieutenant Colonel John G. Wilcox, US Army

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New Concept for Battlefield Employment of Nuclear Weapons
Major Calvin A. Buzzell, US Army, and Major John P. Rose, US Army